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Chapter 1: Introducing Frameworks for Internet Governance
Introduction
David Carroll graduated from Bowdoin College cum laude in 1997, with a degree in Art
History and Religion. In typical liberal arts fashion, his honors thesis explored the impact of
tourism on Balinese dance-drama, a niche interest that has little to do with Carroll’s work today.
Technology had yet to captivate the world. In 1997, fewer than 40 percent of US households owned
a PC.1 IBM’s Deep Blue supercomputer beat reigning world chess champion Garry Kasparov in a
game of chess.2 DVDs had been around for a total of two years.3 “Back when I was [at Bowdoin],
we had just discovered the Internet on Unix workstations running pine email and the Mosaic
browser to see the earliest websites.”4
Twenty years later, Carroll is neither museum curator nor priest, but starring in the Netflix
documentary The Great Hack. Technology is no longer an accessory to daily lives, but has
integrated into daily lives—sometimes, with disastrous consequences. The Great Hack tells such
a story, focusing on the practices of UK political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica, now
infamous for harvesting the Facebook profiles of 87 million users to influence voter behavior in
more than 200 elections around the world, including the 2016 United States presidential election.5
One of these 87 million users was David Carroll. The Great Hack follows his legal battle to retrieve

1

Statista, "Percentage of households with a computer at home in the United States from 1984 to 2010," Statista, last
modified 2019, accessed November 21, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/184685/percentage-of-householdswith-computer-in-the-united-states-since-1984/.
2
Bruce Weber, "Swift and Slashing, Computer Topples Kasparov," New York Times (New York City, New York,
USA), May 12, 1997, accessed November 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/12/nyregion/swift-andslashing-computer-topples-kasparov.html.
3
The Editors of Encyclopedia Brittanica, ed., "DVD," Encyclopedia Brittanica, last modified September 21, 2018,
accessed November 22, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/DVD.
4
David Caroll, "Bowdoin Student Interested in Data Privacy," e-mail message to author, August 14, 2019.
5
The Great Hack, directed by Karim Amer Amer and Jehane Noujaim, Netflix, 2019.
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his data from Cambridge Analytica by employing a patchwork of European data protection laws,
tracking the development of the Cambridge Analytica scandal as it escalates to gain the attention
of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (UK
ICO), and the British High Court.6
The Cambridge Analytica Scandal is just one example of how the Internet is making the
world a smaller place. Since the Internet allows data to be regularly exchanged over borders at an
unprecedented volume and speed, the Internet has been touted as a global commons7 allowing for
the transnational exchange of information, goods, and culture.8 Data flows, or the transfer of
information between computer servers across country borders, are also highly lucrative; according
to a UN report, between 4 and 15% of global GDP is attributed to the digital economy.9 It is in the
interest of all states to maintain open data flows for the purpose of economic prosperity, and there
are network and bandwagon benefits associated with doing so. This means that if one country joins
a network, it also benefits all the other parties also on the network because the value of the network
overall increases.10 Therefore, interstate cooperation has been widely considered the most
appropriate means of handling transnational internet issues.11

6

The Great Hack, directed by Karim Amer Amer and Jehane Noujaim, Netflix, 2019.
Gerald Stang, “Global Commons:” (European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2013), JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06840; Milton Mueller, John Mathiason, and Hans Klein, “The Internet and Global
Governance: Principles and Norms for a New Regime,” Global Governance 13, no. 2 (2007): 237–54.
8
Mark Raymond, “Puncturing the Myth of the Internet as a Commons,” Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs, 2013, 53–64.
9
“Digital Economy Report 2019: Value Creation and Capture Implications for Developing Countries” (New York,
New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/der2019_overview_en.pdf.
10
Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, Globalization and Cyberspace, Digital Futures
(Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017).
11
Bertrand de La Chapelle, Paul Fehlinger, and GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE,
“JURISDICTION ON THE INTERNET: FROM LEGAL ARMS RACE TO TRANSNATIONAL
COOPERATION,” A Universal Internet in a Bordered World (Centre for International Governance Innovation,
2016), JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05249.10; Scott J. Shackelford, Governing New Frontiers in the
Information Age: Toward Cyber Peace (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
7

2

Concerns about privacy and data protection pose a threat to maintaining the openness of
these flows. In response to scandals like Cambridge Analytica, states have adopted data protection
laws that afford them the power to dictate the conditions under which data can be transferred to
other jurisdictions, even halting the transfer altogether under extreme circumstances.12 While data
protection laws are motivated in part by the advent of the Internet, states that are more likely to
adopt data protection laws are also those that tend to give privacy the status of a human right, and
have an extensive legal history associated with that right.13 Therefore, states justify the regulation
or suspension of data flows by suggesting that it puts the rights of their citizens at risk.14
However, there are also special characteristics of data that make it difficult to regulate like
any other good. While the trade of goods may be regulated at the border by quotas or sanctions,
data can occupy many places at once, many jurisdictions at the same time, unlike most other
goods.15 Data is also non-rival, which means that consumption by one entity does not prevent
simultaneous consumption by another.16 Nor is it divisible, which means that data is irreducible in
its intrinsic value. This paper will use the phrase “the nature of data” to succinctly refer to these
characteristics. The nature of data encourages states to employ extraterritoriality as a legal
instrument to expand its regulatory reach. The consequences are that such laws may lead to
regulatory spill-over into other jurisdictions, whether it be de facto changing corporate and

12

Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment?
Daniel J. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” Calif. L. Rev.. California Law Review, no. IR (n.d.),
http://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1118238. Alan F. Westin, “Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals
for the 1970’s. Part I--The Current Impact of Surveillance on Privacy,” Columbia Law Review 66, no. 6 (1966):
1003–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/1120997.
14
Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment?
15
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regulatory Co-Operation for an Interdependent
World (Paris: OECD Pub., 1994), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264062436-en.
16
Yan Carrière-Swallow and Vikram Haksar, “The Economics and Implications of Data: An Integrated Perspective”
(International Monetary Fund, September 2019), file:///Users/sasajovanovic/Downloads/TEIDEA.pdf.
13
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individual behaviors, or de jure influencing the decision-making of institutions.17 This paper will
refer to these collective consequences as the “extraterritorial effects” of such legislation.
This paper will use the EU-US relationship to empirically analyze the extent to which of
two frameworks, presented in this chapter, better explains the development of data protection
regulation between two major powers. In 2016, the EU adopted the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR),18 a data protection law which has since acquired the title of the strongest data
protection law in the world.19 The passing of the GDPR was hugely consequential towards the
maintenance of open data flows because the law bestows the EU the power to determine the
“adequacy” of third countries to grant EU citizens with data protection once their data is exported
out of the EU.20 While individual companies are provided the ability to conduct data transfers
under certain EU conditions, this segments domestic markets into those companies that can afford
to be GDPR compliant against those that cannot, since access to the EU market is economically
advantageous. In order for the entire data flow to be GDPR compliant, the third country needs to
either adopt data protection laws of their own that amount to adequacy per the EU’s determination,
or it needs to engage in bilateral negotiations. The US opted for the later.21
Therefore, regulation of data flows presents a serious governance challenge. While it would
be beneficial to all states to maintain open data flows, it likewise difficult to diminish the sovereign
right of a state to attempt to control a data flow if it is in the interest of their citizens. In light of

17

Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020).
18
Commission Regulation 16/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) p 1-88.
19
Adam Satariano, “G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading Tech Watchdog,” The New
York Times, May 24, 2018, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/technology/europe-gdprprivacy.html.
20
Commission Regulation 16/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) p 1-88.
21
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and
Security, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691189956.
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this reality, two frameworks can pointedly describe the dichotomy of outcomes which may emerge
as a result of this dilemma. Complex interdependence is a framework which emphasizes bilateral
cooperation as a resolution to instances when states are linked by common goals and mutual
reliance, like a data flow for instance, and has been widely regarded by scholars as a valuable
perspective when thinking about Internet governance.22 On the other hand, the Cyber Westphalian
System (CWS) 23 is a framework which emphasizes bilateral competition, as states use strategies
to pursue their own interests and reassert their dominance over a transnational platform. When the
success of bilateral cooperation hinges on joint collaboration, state authority is in danger of waning
in an interdependent environment, and so CWS offers a way to comprehend states which either do
not want to cooperate, or are responsive to competing priorities which complicates inter-state
cooperation.24
The Privacy Shield in 2016 emerged as a bilateral solution to afford the US adequacy under
the GDPR, providing US companies with access to the EU market under joint oversight of US and
EU institutions.25 However, whether or not this agreement will succeed in the long run is subject
to speculation.26 This is not the first time that the two states have attempted to resolve issues
concerning the EU-US data flow. The US has previously used bilateral agreements as a way to

22

Kenneth S. Rogerson, “INFORMATION INTERDEPENDENCE: Keohane and Nye’s Complex Interdependence
in the Information Age,” Information, Communication & Society 3, no. 3 (January 2000): 415–36,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180051033379.
23
While Demchak uses CPS as a shorthand for the term, Cyber-Westphalian System, this paper will employ CWS
as a shorthand for clarity reasons. Chris Demchak and U.S. Naval War College, “Three Futures for a Post-Western
Cybered World,” Military Cyber Affairs 3, no. 1 (June 2018), https://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.3.1.1044.
24
Samantha Bradshaw et al., “THE EMERGENCE OF CONTENTION IN GLOBAL INTERNET
GOVERNANCE,” Who Runs the Internet? (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017), JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05243.8.
25
“EU Commission and United States Agree on New Framework for Transatlantic Data Flows: EU-US Privacy
Shield,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 4, 2020,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_216.
26
Mark Scott, “U.S. and Europe in ‘Safe Harbor’ Data Deal, but Legal Fight May Await,” The New York Times,
February 2, 2016, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/us-europe-safe-harbor-datadeal.html.
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shield itself from forced adoption of data protection laws.27 Therefore, the EU-US relationship
presents an intriguing case. On the one hand, regulatory cooperation is an expected outcome
because both states are equally dependent on maintaining open flows. Furthermore, since their
domestic markets are of a similar size, neither actor is able to economically coerce the other to
accede to their own preferences.28 On the other hand, regulatory competition is an expected
outcome since the EU and the US have significantly different legal approaches to data protection.29
Unlike the EU, the US does not extend a right to data protection to its citizens, and the American
preference for laissez-faire economic growth considers data protection a barrier to the
liberalization of trade.30 Therefore, the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR runs into conflict with
the US being able to pursue these interests, making the US reticent to cooperate with the EU in
bilateral coordination.
The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to the following questions: How do
differences in the institutional and legal histories in the EU and US conceptions of data protection
shape regulatory competition and cooperation? Why and how does the GDPR exert its influence
beyond the EU jurisdiction, and is its dominance likely to continue?
This chapter will introduce two theoretical approaches that illustrate the conditions when
states are likely to compete or cooperate over complex policy questions like data protection. The
second section will present the complex interdependence literature, as well as the conditions under

27

Henry Farrell, “Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce—The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor
Arrangement,” International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 277–306, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303572022.
28
Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 616 (2008): 110–24.
29
Fernando Mendez and Mario Mendez, “Comparing Privacy Regimes: Federal Theory and the Politics of Privacy
Regulation in the European Union and the United States,” Publius 40, no. 4 (2010): 617–45; Franz-Stefan Gady,
“EU/U.S. Approaches to Data Privacy and the ‘Brussels Effect’: A Comparative Analysis,” Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs, 2014, 12–23.
30
Joshua P. Meltzer, “Cross-Border Data Flows, the Internet and What It Means for U.S. and EU Trade and
Investment,” Brookings (blog), October 21, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/10/21/crossborder-data-flows-the-internet-and-what-it-means-for-u-s-and-eu-trade-and-investment/.
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which regulatory cooperation is likely to occur. The third section in this chapter will present the
CWS literature, and the conditions under which regulatory competition is likely to occur. The
fourth section will suggest that there is also a third, inter-state equilibrium which can explain
situations when states are able to benefit from certain competitive advantages of their regulation,
also known as soft power,31 under conditions of regulatory cooperation. I will argue that the EU
has cultivated soft power through its institutional and legal history, which in turn provides it with
a competitive advantage to obtain favorable outcomes in regulatory cooperation with the US.

Friends with Benefits: The Complex Interdependence of Shared Data Flows
Keohane and Nye first made use of the term ‘complex interdependence’ in 1977 to describe
how increased interconnectedness among states encourage politics of interdependence. This
“allows for events and situations in one area, depend on, or are influenced by, those in another,
and most importantly this relationship can be reciprocal.”32 Keohane later notes that reciprocity is
not a common feature in most of international relations because of the ability of more powerful
actors to coerce, dominate, or exploit lesser actors. Reciprocity is defined as “exchanges of roughly
equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the other
in such a way that good is returned for good and bad for bad.”33
Reciprocity is present in the case of EU-US relations because the actors have roughly
equivalent economic size and political importance in the international community.34 Further, they
are similarly reliant on mutual cooperation; the fact that both the EU and the US have repeatedly

31

Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580.
Rogerson, “INFORMATION INTERDEPENDENCE,” 416.
33
Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 8.
34
Daniel S. Hamilton et al., “Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership,” Shoulder to Shoulder: (Atlantic Council,
2009), JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03552.6.
32
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made efforts to maintain data protection agreements indicative of this reliance. At the same time,
because reciprocity is uncommon, the EU-US relationship is not representative of all inter-state
relations since each actor may otherwise adopt coercive tactics in relations with less powerful
states, meaning that the same degree of bilateral negotiation may not arise as in this case.35
However, precisely because of this fact, it is important to take note of the outcomes from clashes
between the EU and the US since the result of these negotiations may influence other
intergovernmental agreements that involve one of these states.
Complex interdependence has primarily been employed to explain state behavior under
conditions of globalization, but there is a theoretical overlap in thinking about globalized trade and
data flows, since both are means of connection through exchange between two entities.36 In this
way, they are transnational.37 At the same time, while the trade of goods may be regulated by
quotas or sanctions, these same methods cannot be applied to the internet because of the nature of
data. If anything, the Internet is more transnational as a result of these features, making it all the
more difficult to govern, and pushing for states to adopt laws which employ extraterritoriality like
the GDPR.38 Complex interdependence calls attention to the importance of cooperation as a means
of achieving common goals of states, in this case being the preservation of the EU-US data flow.39
For these reasons, complex interdependence has been highly influential amongst scholars when
thinking about internet governance.

35

Keohane and Nye discuss power asymmetries among actors can induce behavior to align with the priorities of the
more powerful state. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed, Scott,
Foresman/Little, Brown Series in Political Science (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1989).
36
Rogerson, “INFORMATION INTERDEPENDENCE.”
37
de La Chapelle, Fehlinger, and GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, “JURISDICTION
ON THE INTERNET: FROM LEGAL ARMS RACE TO TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION.”
38
Sean Watts and Theodore Richard, “BASELINE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CYBERSPACE.,”
Lewis & Clark Law Review 22, no. 3 (September 2018): 771–840; JOANNE SCOTT, “Extraterritoriality and
Territorial Extension in EU Law,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 62, no. 1 (2014): 87–125.
39
G. Gunasekara, “The ‘Final’ Privacy Frontier? Regulating Trans-Border Data Flows,” International Journal of
Law and Information Technology 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 147–79, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eam004.
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Complex interdependence highlights multiple channels of communications between two
jurisdictions, not limited to interstate relations, which may erode the exclusive authority of the
state to govern its domestic affairs.40 For instance, multinational corporations must be responsive
to many populations at once,41 but are also able to influence political agendas in multiple
jurisdictions through lobbying or shaping consumer expectations to align with their own corporate
values.42 Social media has a prominent effect on the ways consumers communicate with one
another across borders, shaping their perspectives in reaction to global events like the Cambridge
Analytica scandal.43 Transnational activist networks have spurred citizens to engage in collective
action domestically or online, while sharing strategies with other organizations around the world.44
Therefore, the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR may manifest themselves across American
society largely as a result of these multiple channels of communication.
Finally, non-state actors may directly influence the deal-making process for a bilateral
agreement. While multiple channels of communication allow for similar sectors to interact across
borders, different sectors might also influence each other.45 Non-state actors may take several
forms, such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.
Therefore, institutional dialogue between states is not devoid from pressures to include
perspectives other than those represented in the negotiations.46

40

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
B. R. Baliga and Alfred M. Jaeger, “Multinational Corporations: Control Systems and Delegation Issues,” Journal
of International Business Studies 15, no. 2 (1984): 25–40.
42
Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Multinationals: The Game and the Rules: Multinational Corporations in World Politics,”
August 31, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1974-10-01/multinationals-game-and-rules-multinationalcorporations-world-politics.
43
Annelise Russell and Maxwell McCombs, “The Media,” in Policy Analysis in the United States, ed. John A. Hird,
1st ed. (Bristol University Press, 2018), 265–80, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22h6q1x.20.
44
Sebastian Haunss, “Privacy Activism after Snowden: Advocacy Networks or Protest?,” n.d., 19.
45
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Accountability of Government Networks,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
8, no. 2 (2001): 347–67; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “How to Succeed in the Networked World: A Grand Strategy for
the Digital Age,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (2016): 76–89.
46
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
41
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Complex interdependence has been the dominant framework for thinking about Internet
issues because of the Internet’s ability to multiply the consequences of reciprocity of actors
through the use of multiple channels, raising the importance of non-state actors in formal interstate dialogue as a result.47 The conditions for complex interdependence are the following. First,
states engage in cooperation to overcome shared challenges and achieve shared goals. Second,
multiple channels of communication allow for a variety of actors to exchange information, react
to events beyond their jurisdiction, and change behavior within their jurisdiction. Third, non-state
actors can present a significant challenge to the success of bilateral agreements because they
represent views that are not portrayed in formal negotiations. While CWS suggests that the Internet
is another instrument for a state to exercise control, complex interdependence highlights the novel
challenges of the Internet that complicate this underlying assumption.

Territorializing the Internet: The Cyber Westphalian System
If complex interdependence serves to explain why states engage in cooperation in the first
place, then CWS explains the ways in which states resist cooperation in order to pursue their own
interests.48 According to legal scholar Stephen Krasner, “Westphalian Sovereignty… refers to the
autonomy of domestic authority structures—that is, the absence of authoritative external
influences.”49 This approach is associated with realist arguments in international relations that

47

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” February 15,
2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1998-09-01/power-and-interdependence-information-age; Joseph
Nye, “The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities,” Global Commission on Internet Governance
(Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 2014),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no1.pdf.
48
Demchak and U.S. Naval War College, “Three Futures for a Post-Western Cybered World.”
49
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, “Problematic Sovereignty,” in Problematic Sovereignty, ed. STEPHEN D.
KRASNER, Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (Columbia University Press, 2001), 2,
https://doi.org/10.7312/kras12178.5.
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places the role of the state at the center of analysis.50 The state engages in efforts to increase its
hard power, or ability to wage war successfully, relative to other states.51
CWS relies on the current framework of international law to assign authority to distinct
states, delineate states from one another, and justify claims to sovereignty.52 While some legal
scholars have questioned the applicability of territorial jurisdiction to a digital space,53 Laura
DeNardis points that out that it is false to claim that the Internet is purely devoid of territorial
significance pointing to critical Internet infrastructure like Internet exchange points (IXPs),
database servers, and physical transmission lines, as the physical manifestation of the Internet.54
In this way, the Internet is a “reflection of the current international system in a new domain,”55
which allows for jurisdiction as defined by territory to continue. While on the one hand, bilateral
agreements might encourage inter-state cooperation, bilateral agreements might also set the
conditions for legal interoperability.56 Legal interoperability provides the parameters for
interactions between states while preserving the domestic legal attitudes of each state, thereby
securing state sovereignty.57

50

David A. Baldwin, “Realism,” in Power and International Relations, A Conceptual Approach (Princeton
University Press, 2016), 123–38, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1q1xsp6.8.
51
Baldwin.
52
Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict,” The American
Journal of Comparative Law 57, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 631–76, https://doi.org/10.5131/ajcl.2008.0018; Michael N.
Schmitt and NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, eds., Tallinn Manual on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare: Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
53
David R. Johnson and David Post, “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” Stanford Law Review 48,
no. 5 (1996): 1367–1402, https://doi.org/10.2307/1229390.
54
Laura DeNardis, “Internet Points of Control as Global Governance,” Internet Governance Papers (Waterloo,
Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, August 2013),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no2_3.pdf.
55
A Liaropoulos, “An International Cyber-Order under Construction?,” Journal of Information Warfare 12, no. 2
(2013): 23.
56
John Gorham Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop the Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems (New
York: Basic Books, 2012), http://proquestcombo.safaribooksonline.com/9780465021970.
57
Amedeo Santosuosso and Alessandra Malerba, “Legal Interoperability as a Comprehensive Concept in
Transnational Law,” Law, Innovation and Technology 6, no. 1 (May 27, 2014): 51–73,
https://doi.org/10.5235/17579961.6.1.51.
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Moreover, CWS has found resonance amongst Internet scholars that view the Internet as
another platform unto which hard power can dictate hierarchical authority among states. Since
state sovereignty is related to the ability of the state to monopolize violence, Chris Demchak argues
that a parallel exists between cyber conflict and “traditional kinetic war,”58 and many of the
customs of armed combat hold up in digital struggles like the principle of mutual recognition. The
Internet presents a security dilemma which has encouraged states like the US to militarize their
intelligence capabilities to take advantage of the volume of information provided online.59 Milton
Mueller argues that the “attempt by governments to align informational flows with their
jurisdictional boundaries,”60 including the national securitization of the internet, like that of the
US, and territorialization of information flows, like that of the EU, are state efforts at preserving
centralized power.61
The literature on regulatory regimes suggests that, even if states are able to put aside their
domestic interests in order to cooperate on shared issues, challenges persist that complicate the
possibility of successful cooperation.62 For instance, states like the EU and the US have differed
in their understanding of fundamental concepts, i.e. data protection, which makes negotiations
difficult.63 Bargaining failures are likely to arise as a result of preference divergence, as states

58

Chris C. Demchak, “Uncivil and Post-Western Cyber Westphalia,” The Cyber Defense Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 55.
Chris C. Demchak and Peter J. Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age: The Coming Decades,” in The
Global Politics of Science and Technology - Vol. 1: Concepts from International Relations and Other Disciplines,
ed. Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014),
91–113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55007-2_5.
60
Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment?, 212.
61
Mueller.
62
Daniel W Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, 2008,
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400828630.
63
Andrew Hurrell, “Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality,” in Power in Global Governance, ed.
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 33–58, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491207.002; Wolfram F. Hanrieder,
“Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of
Foreign Policy,” The American Political Science Review 61, no. 4 (1967): 971–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953399.
59

12

agree on the objective of a negotiation, but differ in the details of maintaining the agreement.64 In
the case of data flows, the states may disagree on the appropriate degree of regulatory rigor
necessary to maintain consistent treatment across the data flow. One state may also oppose the
other state’s choice of institutions tasked with regulatory compliance.65 Finally, the question of the
willingness of states to uphold the negotiation and not renege on their commitment is a constant
obstacle to successful cooperation.66 For cooperation to be successful, the adjustment costs
associated with changed institutional behavior and firm practice must be sufficiently low in order
for the benefits from cooperation to be worth it.67 Therefore, the legal attitudes of each state may
serve as barriers to cooperation, since significant departure from precedent might incur intolerable
adjustment costs to the state.68
The literature summarized in this section informs the selection of conditions this paper will
employ for CWS. First, states are driven by domestic interests which drives competition with other
states, whether it be in the explicit securitization of the Internet, like the US, or the use of data
protection regulation, like the EU. Second, disagreements over fundamental concepts, i.e., data
protection, cause different legal attitudes and institutional structure which may result in different
cost-benefit analyses making it difficult to maintain agreements over time. Third, the commitment
of states to maintain their promises, either in light of competing priorities or due to institutional
mismatch, further complicates the ability of states to make an agreement that will endure over
time. Fourth, jurisdictional limits must be clear in order to adhere to the international legal system.
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A Third Way: Soft Power
Both of these frameworks are grounded on an underlying assumption that state power is
expressed aggressively through waging war or conflict. Complex interdependence suggests that
actors may lose power because they are opting for cooperation instead of conflict.69 On the other
hand, CWS suggests that that states are unlikely to cooperate because they are reticent to concede
the ability to influence other actors through military aggression and impose hostile threats.70
However, while it is true that cooperation may result in states losing their ability to utilize so-called
hard power, the Internet provides states the capacity to capitalize on soft power.
Soft power allows states to pursue their domestic interests through the use of multiple
channels. Soft power is defined as “the ability to achieve goals through attraction… convincing
others to follow or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired
behavior.”71 Soft power can be achieved in a number of ways, whether it be the passive diffusion
of a norm or culture based on its ideational appeal72 or the conscientious refinement of domestic
laws and institutions that encourage behavior to align with the preferences of the state.73 The
economic capability of a state may also provide a means of cultivating soft power, since it is able
to dictate entrance and exit from its market.74 States with large domestic markets or resource-based
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economies are particularly able to employ this method. Scholars disagree about whether or not soft
power achieved through economic or political means amounts to coercion,75 however discussion
generally concentrates on the relative ability of the pressured population to resist or opt out of the
outcome which the state would like to enforce as an indicator of coercion.76 Soft power is attractive
to states because it can maintain legitimacy without needing to expend the same extent of resources
as hard power demands.77
In the literature, the EU has been singled out as a political entity which is particularly
capable of cultivating soft power by encouraging international policy convergence in favor of
European regulation.78 Anu Bradford uses the term the “Brussels effect” to explain how five
features specific to the EU and to EU institutions have given rise to the de facto and de jure
adoption of EU regulations. First, as the largest economy in the world,79 the EU already attracts
producers to gain entrance into its lucrative market. However, Bradford is quick to point out that
“not all states with large markets become sources of global standards.”80 The regulatory capacity
to enforce sanctions depends on the quality of domestic institutions in the form of resources or
regulatory expertise, is the second factor.81 Third, the EU must have a political preference for strict
rules.82 Fourth, the EU must have a predisposition to regulate inelastic targets which makes it
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difficult for actors to escape compliance by shifting operations to a different jurisdiction.83 Finally,
the non-divisibility of standards is the most significant feature that persuades corporations to
globalize their operations to comply with the most stringent standard in jurisdictions other than the
EU.84 Because of the nature of data, it is often technically not feasible or too costly for a
corporation to segment corporate practices according to jurisdictional limits.
The Internet provides an opportunity for states to employ soft power to an even greater
degree. Since the Internet allows for multiple channels of communication amongst many
jurisdictions, this provides states with more avenues to promulgate their standards and norms
quicker than before the Internet.85 In a way, complex interdependence becomes a strategy unto
itself.86 Cooperation allows states to forego hard power since they rely on one another to achieve
some goal or resolve a challenge. At the same time, complex interdependence enables soft power
since these channels remain open allowing states to compete with their relative regulatory
capacities. With the appropriate institutional structure and legal framework, states can influence
the behavior of non-state actors and reinforce their preferences in jurisdictions other than their
own.

Methodology
This paper is motivated by two related empirical puzzles. First, it is surprising that the
institutional and legal histories of these two states directly motivate their priorities when
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negotiating the EU-US data flow. The EU developed the GDPR out of a decades-long, multilateral
approach to regulation which largely emerged from facilitation by intergovernmental
organizations that predated the founding of the EU.87 On the other hand, the US regulatory
approach to data protection is highly fragmented, narrow, and primarily self-regulated, which does
not reach the regulatory rigor of the EU model.88 The relative differences in the two approaches
become important when the two states came together to determine a bilateral agreement. These
differences can also lead to the failure of agreements like the Safe Harbor Agreement, the
predecessor of the Privacy Shield. Second, whether or not the Privacy Shield represents inter-state
cooperation or legal interoperability is particularly important for the GDPR, since an agreement
which falls short of compliance would require the suspension of the data flow.89 As the EU
attempts to promote its own priorities with the regulatory battle with the US, the GDPR endorses
a particular norm of data protection through its extraterritorial effects, even to jurisdictions like the
US that formerly lacked such a perspective.
The first research question is, how do different legal approaches to data protection in the
US and the EU conform to expectations of state competition, as anticipated by CWS, or
cooperation, an outcome predicted by complex interdependence scholars? The second research
question is, why and how does the EU’s GDPR exert its influence beyond its jurisdiction, and is
its dominance likely to continue?
I will compare the relative regulatory capabilities of the EU in the US in the bilateral
struggle over data protection as the result of their institutional and legal histories, which provides
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a frame of reference when considering the stability of the GDPR’s dominance. This paper will
employ a process tracing methodology to better understand how models of data protection emerged
in the EU and US, with particular attention to the European process that led to the creation of the
GDPR. Therefore, one dependent variable is the GDPR itself. Second, I will focus on discerning
the conditions which influence the dynamic relationship between the EU and the US over data
protection to determine the appropriateness of either framework in explaining the relationship as
either cooperative or competitive. While the presence or absence of these conditions cannot be
causally linked to the outcome, primary and secondary sources will support inference judgments.
I relied on primary sources like public opinion polls, news media, official records of
intergovernmental organizations, and government documents like reports, bills, laws and hearings.
I referred to major cases from the European Court of Justice to either to clarify provisions of the
GDPR or to shed light on the legality of EU-US data protection agreements under EU law. As it
pertains the EU, I sourced government documents were primarily from the EU Commission, in the
form of laws, adequacy decisions, and reports. Recommendations, reports, and proposals from the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as the Council of
Europe from 1960 to 1985, shed light on European cooperation efforts on data protection prior to
the formation of the EU. I also used secondary sources include various academic scholarship
including journal articles, scholarly books, handbooks, news media, and textbooks.

Overview of Thesis
I will argue that the EU is in a unique position to advance its own approach with the GDPR
due to its institutional and legal history that evolved out of complex interdependence. The
extraterritorial effects of the GDPR indicate that the EU has embodied soft power that allows the
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EU to entice behavior in the US jurisdiction to comply with the regulation, despite the Privacy
Shield which intends to lower the standard for US corporations. Therefore, I complicate the
dichotomy of regulatory competition or regulatory cooperation by suggesting that, while complex
interdependence remains important to understanding Internet governance, other conditions not
captured by complex interdependence motivate state behavior as well.
The chapter break-down is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the GDPR as a regulation,
demonstrating the degree of departure from precedent it raises, as well as the historical origins of
European data protection law. Chapter 3 transitions to focus on the US case, explaining how data
protection developed historically as a result of different processes and principles, in order to
demonstrate the extent of legal misalignment between the two states even before a digital data
flow connected the two jurisdictions. Additionally, Chapter 3 will present the observed
extraterritorial effects of the GDPR as evidence of market-based harmonization in the US. Chapter
4 will focus on the efforts to achieve a bilateral agreement between the two states in order to
approve the US for adequacy under the GDPR. Chapter 5 will consist of a theoretical analysis of
the material presented in Chapter 2, 3, and 4, and weigh the merits of the frameworks introduced
in this chapter.
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Chapter 2: The General Data Protection Regulation and its Origins

The passing of the GDPR was hugely consequential. The GDPR is widely regarded as the
strongest data protection law in the world, governing all of the data flows which either involve the
EU directly, or that include the data of EU citizens.90 The volume of the data flow is difficult to
comprehend. For reference, the EU population is 446 million people, the third largest population
in the world after China and India. Facebook collects an average of 29,000 data points on a user.91
A simple calculation finds that Facebook collects 12,934,000,000,000 data points on EU users,
alone. While the average number of data points collected for non-Facebook platforms is closer to
1,500,92 these numbers are meant to crudely illustrate the fact that the GDPR is incredibly powerful
in a large part because of the amount of data it is governing.
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section presents the contents of the GDPR,
including the rights afforded to the user, organizational and technical requirements for
corporations, and bureaucratic scaffolding which contributes to the GDPR’s enforcement. The
expansiveness of the GDPR elaborates upon a European tradition which values data protection as
a human right;93 however, the GDPR raises it to the highest level of stringency under EU law. This
section will allow for analysis in Chapter 3 concerning the normative appeal of the GDPR that
might motivate extraterritorial adoption.
The second section presents the origins of the GDPR. The EU achieved European
integration via multilateral cooperation of EU member states, thereby conforming to many
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expectations of complex interdependence.94 Before the EU was even formed, international
organizations like the OECD and the Council of Europe played an instrumental role in facilitating
multiple channels of communication among later EU member states.95 The GDPR incorporates
many recommendations proposed by the OECD and the Council of Europe in its own language.
With the founding of the EU, the EU coupled pre-existing legal agreement on data protection with
a supranational tier of institutionalization.96

The EU Really Wants to Protect (Everyone’s) Data: The General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR affords the data subject with the broadest rights to data protection in the world,
which has resulted in notable attention on GDPR-related cases to understand how these rights
manifest themselves in practice.97 A data subject is legal jargon for “an identifiable natural
person… who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity
of that natural person.”98 “Personal data” that is protected under the GDPR is any information
related to the data subject. Besides this expansive definition of personal data, the GDPR also
increases the scope of applicability by affording these rights to any data subject in the EU
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regardless of nationality, meaning that a citizen from the US that visits the EU may gain the rights
afforded to the data subject upon entering EU jurisdiction.99
The data subject is afforded comprehensive rights over his or her data, setting the
conditions for negotiations between the data subject and third party. Transparent communication
is required between entities which may handle personal data and the data subject. This is to ensure
that the data subject is aware of the location of his or her personal data. The data subject is also
afforded the right to access the information, the right to rectify or correct the information, the right
to restrict processing of personal information, and the right to notification of when these actions
are taken or completed.100 The data subject also has the right to data portability, meaning that the
he or she might transfer the personal data records which belong to him or her from one entity to
another.101
To a certain extent, these rights reinforce the commodification of data, or the treatment of
data as property, by setting the rules for bargaining between the data subject and third party.102
The important caveat is that these rights persist even after a bargain has taken place, both assuring
stringent protection of the rights as it migrates from the data subject to third party, recognizing the
nature of data as non-rival. The data subject is also afforded the right to object to profiling or
automated decision-making.103 Profiling refers to the automated processing of personal data to
evaluate certain things about an individual, such as the likelihood of purchasing a good or service;
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however, it has since expanded to be used in political campaigns as well.104 Automated decisionmaking refers to the process of deciding by automated means without human involvement. For
instance, this may take place in instances where algorithms are the sole determinant of outcomes;
loan accreditations are a common example.105
The right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten, is the right which has received
the most popular attention due to its novelty. Only the EU and Argentina have put the right to
erasure into practice.106 The right to erasure refers to the right to have personal data about the data
subject removed from Internet searches and other directories such as Google. According to Google
v. Spain, search engines are responsible for the content they point to, but are not required to do so
globally.107 The right to erasure is intended to return agency to the data subject regarding situations
when there may be disclosures of their own personal data without their knowledge or consent and
may hold perpetual consequences for them in the future. 108 For instance, the right to erasure may
be extended in an instance of revenge porn, when one partner publicizes intimate photographs,
images or videos that involve their partner without their consent.109 Critics claim that is provides
a legal basis for user-driven censorship. Google has received 650,000 requests to remove over 2.43
million URLs under the right to be forgotten, one of which involved a doctor requesting that
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information concerning his failed medical procedures be removed.110 Others point to the archival
importance of retaining original information, suggesting that doing otherwise may cause a
rewriting of history.

111

The GDPR has limitations in paragraph 3 of Article 17 chiefly for this

reason.112
While these rights empower the data subject in theory, the practical implementation of
these rights have been contested. Researchers have been able to uniquely identify 95% of
individuals in a sample set with just four data points.113 For this reason, the GDPR also require
organizational and technical measures from entities that control or process data, in order to ensure
the fair treatment of disclosed information.114 Depending on the size of the corporation, a data
protection officer may be required to monitor data protection compliance, lead awareness training
to educate employees about appropriate data protection practices, develop internal codes of
conduct, and organize regular auditing.115 The GDPR employs the Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA), which is a legally required document to help aid in the auditing process.116
The GDPR uses the privacy-by-design and privacy-by default frameworks,117 a proposed standard
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according to the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), to outline the ways in which data protection
is maintained technically, including systems security, encryption, and pseudonymization.118
Pseudonymization is a means of de-identifying personal data from the data subject.119 Those
entities that lie outside of the EU must make “binding and contractual commitments towards the
entity that transfers data to them, via contractual or other legally binding instrument,”120 in order
to apply these safeguards, and may be accompanied by a certification. 121 Should an entity be found
to not comply with the GDPR, it receives a sanction of either 10 million euros or 4% of global
turnover, whichever is larger.122
The GDPR also forwards the establishment of a “data protection regime” in the EU, by
erecting a bureaucratic apparatus for handling data protection abuses.123 Each state has a national
data protection authority (DPA) that is responsible for enforcing data protection regulation in their
jurisdiction, assessing complaints, and enforcing sanctions.124 These DPAs have the technical
background to handle issues related to data protection, and are therefore adept to handle unique,
regulatory challenges.125 At the same time, this means that there might be uneven enforcement of
the GDPR according to the willingness of the state to invest resources towards the data protection
authority. For instance, Ireland’s DPA office is notoriously underfunded.126 This network of
national authorities reports to the EU Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), whose responsibility is
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to ensure consistent application of the GDPR and promote cooperation amongst the DPAs.127
Together, the EDPS and the DPAs comprise the European Data Protection Board which develops
guidelines, delivers opinions, and provides legislation consultation, in the interest of EU-wide
harmonization.128
The GDPR is therefore novel for a number of reasons. The GDPR is the first regulation for
data protection of the EU. The scope of the GDPR extends the right to data protection to all data
subjects in the EU, a significant departure from the its predecessor, the EU Data Protection
Directive, which limits the right to data protection to EU citizens.129 Data subject are bestowed
with new rights like the right to be forgotten, the meaning of which is still being interpreted in the
courts. While its implementation has attracted criticism claiming that the GDPR is too vague and
difficult to understand to practically adopt, the GDPR established a data protection regime at both
the national and supranational levels to provide guidance to corporations. Moreover, these
authorities are empowered to enforce massive sanctions in cases of noncompliance, such that
infringement comes at a high cost to corporations. However, the GDPR has attracted the most
international attention because of its use of extraterritoriality.130 The GDPR affords the EU the
authority to come to an adequacy decision regarding the ability of third countries to maintain
stringent data protection for EU data beyond the EU jurisdiction. The extraterritoriality of the
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GDPR, which allows the regulation to become truly “general,” is covered in more depth in Chapter
3.
Born of Complex Interdependence: The European Approach to Data Protection
The GDPR is the result of a path-dependent trajectory of European data protection law, as
well as the culmination of over half a century’s worth of policy-making that conforms to the
expectations of complex interdependence. International organizations serve an important function
in complex interdependence, as forums where states may overcome differences, advocate for their
policy of choice, and resolve shared problems.131 For a continent of 44 countries, any of which
have reciprocal effects on the other, international organizations were a primarily means of finding
consensus prior to the EU. Prior to the EU, the OECD and the Council of Europe provided multiple
channels of communication which sometimes gave rise to competing policy recommendations,
later resolved under integration efforts by the EU.132 The EU added a supranational level of
institutionalization to pre-existing agreement forged in these international organizations,
ultimately solidifying multilateral cooperation among member states.
Data protection emerged as a common concern across the continent in the late 1960s, in
response to sweeping technological changes which enabled a scale of electronic data processing
that was previously unforeseen.133 At the time, government institutions were the primary
processors of personal information, mostly in order to estimate demand for social services. While
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Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) enshrined privacy as a human
right in 1953, it was less clear whether that extended to data protection.134
The first question—that is, of whether data protection is privacy and thereby subject to
treatment as a human right—was taken up by the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is an
international organization whose members founded in 1949 by ten European countries, with the
intention of promoting human rights, democracy and rule of law in Europe. It is also the parent
institution of the European Court of Human Rights (ECfHR), a supranational court which hears
cases against member states concerning human rights breaches as outlined in the European
Convention of Humans Rights (ECHR).135 This means that the ECfHR directly wrestled with the
conceptual challenges of defining data protection through its case law, since by the 1970s privacy
had a status as a human right, while data protection did not.136
The Council of Europe found that it was “urgent, pending the possible elaboration of an
international agreement, at once to take steps to prevent further divergencies between the laws of
member states in this field,”137 referring to differences in the data protection laws of member states,
both in content and in type, located in constitutional law, statutory law, or entirely non-existent.138
Most of these differences can be attributed to different legal systems or traditions, but some of this
variety can be also traced to linguistic differences, since the ECHR was originally written in
French. The French “vie privée” means privacy in French, however translates to English as

134

Council of Europe. 1988. “Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) as Amended by Protocol No. 11.” Council of Europe Treaty
Series 155. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
135
A. C. Evans, “European Data Protection Law,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 29, no. 4 (1981):
571–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/839754.
136
González-Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU.
137
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals visà-vis electronic data banks in the private sector (1973), 73.
138
González-Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU.

28

“private life,” which is consequential for state adoption of the ECHR’s recommendations into
domestic law.139 Moreover, the legitimacy of ECfHR decisions can be called into question if it
lacks consistency on data protection cases.140 Should the ECfHR interpret data protection
according to the laws of one-member state but not others, it may be seemed to privilege certain
states above others, or engaging in judicial activism.
Between 1973 and 1974, the Council of Europe made two resolutions to address these
mounting concerns. Resolution 73 (22) and Resolution 74 (29) addressed the “protection of the
privacy of individuals vis a vis electronic data banks” in the private and public sectors,
respectively, offering principles to be adopted in domestic law.141 These included several which
arise in the GDPR, including the right of access, consent, erasure, correction, and data security.142
Notably, neither of these resolutions addressed the issue of information being exchanged across
data banks that may be located in different jurisdictions, or the transfer of data between a member
state and a non-member state. Further, by separating privacy rights as they concern the private
sector, independent of those privacy rights as they concern the public sector, they do not anticipate
the collapsing of the private-public distinction as private companies cooperate with public
entities.143 However, the Council of Europe was primarily concerned with harmonizing a legal

139

Ibid.
VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, “The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights,” in Constitutional
Courts and Democratic Values, A European Perspective (Yale University Press, 2009), 139–54,
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1np70w.16; C. A. Gearty, “The European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of
Civil Liberties: An Overview,” The Cambridge Law Journal 52, no. 1 (1993): 89–127.
141
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of in- dividuals
vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector (1973); Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution
(74) 29 on the protection of in-dividuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public sector (1974).
142
Mantelero, “Regulating Big Data. The Guidelines of the Council of Europe in the Context of the European Data
Protection Framework”; Cécile de Terwangne, “The Work of Revision of the Council of Europe Convention 108 for
the Protection of Individuals as Regards the Automatic Processing of Personal Data,” International Review of Law,
Computers & Technology 28, no. 2 (May 4, 2014): 118–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2013.801588.
143
This issue later arises, with increased data-sharing collaboration between the intelligence agencies and
corporations.
140

29

agreement in the domestic law of member states; after all, the issue of cross-border data flows may
be passively resolved if the laws governing the data agreed transnationally.144
After a comprehensive study comparing data protection laws across its member states, the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Person Data,
or Convention 108,145 was ratified by all member states of the Council of Europe in 1981, and has
since been ratified by all EU member states. Convention 108 was significant for several reasons,
one being that it is the first multilateral treaty to acknowledge the nuance of data protection as a
concept, while also defining it as an independent concept in its own right. It was the first to define
data protection.146 Convention 108 further addressed the issue of cross-border data flows, stating
that it “should make no difference for data users or data subjects whether data processing
operations take place in one or several countries… data subject should be given the same
safeguards for the protection of their rights and interests.”147 In response to Convention 108, the
UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland all passed data protection laws in the next few years, further
harmonizing data protection across the continent.148
While the Council of Europe tackled the legal challenges of standardizing data protection,
the OECD first became interested in the issue of data protection as it became a potential barrier to
trans-border data flows, thereby posing a threat to free trade.149 The OECD is an intergovernmental
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economic organization, with the main purpose of promoting economic development and free trade
through non-binding policy recommendations.150 The purpose of the OECD therefore closely links
to the purpose of the EU, that is to facilitate the EU internal market and guarantee the four free
movements of goods, services, capital and labor.
Starting in 1968, the OECD began committing significant resources towards the issue of
electronic processing and trade, including several reports, seminars, and ministerial meetings,
working parties and symposiums.151 While the OECD was less preoccupied with the distinction
between data protection and privacy and used the concepts interchangeably in its work, it did
acknowledge that data protection is important towards the safeguarding of human liberties and
freedoms.152 With respect to economic competition, the OECD noted that some European
countries used stringent data protection laws as a legal barrier to the exporting of data beyond its
jurisdiction, which may challenge the maintenance of an open data flow. This was in order to
prevent entities from avoiding domestic regulation by transferring data to ‘data havens,’ or
countries with less stringent protection.153
In 1980, the OECD released “The 1980 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,” which raised eight basic principles for national application, and
four basic principles for international application.154 Many of the principles for national application
were later repeated in Convention 108 which was passed the next year, reflective of the fact that
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many member states of the OECD were also member states of the Council of Europe.155 Contrary
to Convention 108, The OECD recommended that member states ensure that trans-border flows
are “uninterrupted and secure,” even if it requires member states to subordinate “developing laws,
policies and practices in the name of privacy and individual rights, which would create obstacles
to trans-border flows of personal data.”156 This suggests that member states sacrifice data
protection in the interest of their citizens for the sake of trans-border harmonization, and directly
comes into conflict with the notion of data protection as a human right. Nevertheless, the OECD
does provide a situation in which it recommends discontinuing data flows. If the third country
“does not yet substantially observe these Guidelines”157 in its national application when engaging
in a data flow with an OECD member state, the member state has the right to discontinue the data
flow. This principle is reminiscent of the adequacy decision under the GDPR, which empowers
the EU to discontinue data flows to third countries that lack a comparable legal framework for data
protection, thereby not being able to afford adequate protection to the personal information of EU
citizens either.158 The 1980 Guidelines served as a valuable counterweight to Convention 108.
While acknowledging the data protection concerns of Convention 108, it likewise cautioned
against stringent, domestic rule-making in the interest of fostering conditions towards shared
economic prosperity.159
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By the time the EU was established in 1993, nearly all of its members had some type of
data protection law that had developed with the guidance of the OECD and the Council of
Europe.160 An organization of supranational and intergovernmental governance, the chief purpose
of the EU is European integration by economic, political and social means.161 Therefore, EU can
be thought of as a hybrid of the goals of the Council of Europe and the OECD, with the important
distinction that the EU holds significantly more authority over its member states. The Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union outlines a system of competences which defines those
policy topics which fall to the exclusive authority of the EU, the exclusive authority of member
state, or shared authority.162 This system favors regulation towards economic and social unity
which is an exclusive competence of the EU, while maintaining respect for the sovereignty of its
sub-states. Regulation has emerged as the preferred mechanism for expressing power, largely
because of this structural limitation on the authority of the EU.163 For instance, the EU is unable
to collect taxes or wage war.164
This authoritative hierarchy is supplemented by a legal framework which consists of
primary and secondary law. Primary law consists of treaties and charters, including the Charter of
the Fundamental Rights of the EU which lists both data protection and privacy as distinct rights,
indicative of the influence of the Council of Europe.165 Secondary law consists of directives,
regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions, with the distinction between a directive

160

González-Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU.
“The Historical Development of European Integration,” European Union, June 18, 2018.
162
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1, Stephanie Switzer, “THE ‘MAKING’ OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,” in
European Law Essentials (Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1–12, www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1g09xcb.6.
163
Veronica L Taylor, “Regulatory Rule of Law,” in Regulatory Theory, ed. PETER DRAHOS, Foundations and
Applications (ANU Press, 2017), 393–414, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crtm.33.
164
Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 2020.
165
“Types of EU Law,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed April 30, 2020,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/types-eu-law_en.
161

33

and regulation being that that a directive provides a legislative goal for EU states to achieve, while
leaving it up to the states to determine the appropriate means of implementing that law.166
Directives serve as a way for states to harmonize their priorities while maintaining the states’
sovereignty. Directives are also often a preliminary step towards a regulation, with a regulation
consisting of a requirement for universal application from all members. The 1995 Data Protection
Directive was the first directive with respect to data protection, and the precursor to the GDPR.
The judicial branch of the EU is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is tasked with
both taking on cases by member states, institutions, and cases referred to it by the courts of member
states, in addition to cases taken by individuals and companies directly.167 Due to direct effect and
supremacy, member states may be required to automatically apply judicial judgments to sovereign
law.168 In combination with the system of competences, this facilitates a degree of legal
harmonization formerly not achieved by other international courts like the ECfHR, exemplified by
the fact that Convention 108 was not binding. Nevertheless, the two courts agree on many issues,
often citing the judicial decisions of one another in their own case law, and the ECHR served as a
reference point for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.169 As a result, it is no surprise
that Convention 108 provided a foundation for the EU when drafting the Data Protection Directive
in 1995, or later with the GDPR.170
The EU relies on an extensive, bureaucratic apparatus to enforce regulation with the
cooperation of sub-states.171 The European Parliament is the main legislative branch, with officials
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elected to the Parliament as representatives of the interests of their country.172 On the contrary, the
executive branch the Commission is elected from the European Parliament to represent the holistic
“European vision,” that is proposing legislation and implementing decisions towards the goal of a
European Single Market.173 The logic of economic integration drives decision-making by the
Commission, which involves reducing barriers to trade, improving the efficient allocation of
resources, and promoting competition, resembling the goals of the OECD. “The EU subscribes to
a view that trade liberalization fails to achieve economic goals without a simultaneous
harmonization of policies.”174
Legal harmonization is in service to the European Single Market, standardizing conditions
for trade across jurisdictions, thereby minimizing transaction costs and encouraging economies of
scale.175 Stringent rules arise in order to ensure state adherence to the EU policies, and this case
especially arises with data protection since it is enshrined as a human right.176 For niche policy
areas like data protection, whose consistent enforcement may require technical expertise, there are
national agencies tasked with ensuring the application of EU law. For instance, national data
protection authorities (DPAs) supervise the application of data protection law, provide advice on
data protection issues, manage complaints filed under the GDPR, and enforce their own fines.177
DPAs the European Data Protection Supervisor make up the European Data Protection Board
(EDPB).178
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Unlike the OECD which is concerned with the global economy, the EU is concerned with
the internal economy amongst member states. The role of international organizations prior to the
founding of the EU helped foster some multilateral consensus concerning data protection, allowing
the EU to expand upon their work. In 2015, the European Single Market was supplemented by a
goal of a Single Digital Market, an initiative of a Europe 2020 proposed strategy towards the
growth of the digital economy, like e-commerce, digital marketing and telecommunications.179 By
reinforcing its economic integration with a legal framework based on shared values like data
protection, in addition to institutions at the national and supranational level, the EU is able to
manage a regulatory regime which gives rise to regulations like the GDPR.

Conclusion
This chapter provides valuable insights concerning the logic of the EU behind the GDPR.
The EU is predisposed to prefer cooperation due to its own institutional and legal history. Prior to
the forming of the EU, international organizations like the OECD and the Council of Europe
provided the first forums tasked with addressing data protection, which allowed for conceptual
linkage among member states to develop. Further, since the OECD and the Council of Europe are
themselves preoccupied with distinct goals—that is global economic trade and human rights in
Europe, respectively—the two organizations raised a variety of data protection concerns. As a
result, this challenged member states to formulate solutions that were fairly comprehensive, raising
general principles for data protection that will later be adopted by the EU. This is a particularly
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impressive feat since much of this occurred in the 1960s to 1980s, before the advent of the
commercial Internet.
As an intergovernmental and supranational organization, the EU relies on its member states
in order to achieve legal harmonization and coordinate the internal market. The foundation of
consensus among member states regarding data protection, already established by the OECD and
the Council of Europe, minimized adjustment costs incurred by EU member states when the EU
tried to implement regulation at the supranational level. The political will to dedicate resources to
data protection was already shared by EU member states, which helped the EU later pass more
stringent regulation like the GDPR. Further, the EU institutionalized data protection by buttressing
stringent rules with the bureaucratic support of national DPAs, harmonized under the supervision
of the EDPS, which ensured consistent application for all data flows in the internal digital market.
Therefore, the GDPR is the result of a path-dependent trajectory of European data
protection law that builds upon over half a century’s worth of policy making. Many of the rights
afforded under the GDPR like the right to access, the right to rectify, and the right to notification,
originated in forums prior to the EU. In turn, the GDPR was able to attain a high level of stringency,
in the form of expansive rights of the data subject, compliance requirements, and high sanctions,
which secured legal harmonization across the continent. While this internal process was largely
motivated by the EU priority to organize its internal market, Chapter 3 will demonstrate how this
institutional and legal history afforded the EU a competitive advantage in the form of soft power
that allowed it to forward the GDPR extraterritorially in other jurisdictions in general, and the US
in particular. The GDPR was able to gain attraction for several reasons, largely because it was the
product of multilateral deliberation internally, but also because of its normative appeal in response
to privacy scandals of the 21st century like Cambridge Analytica.
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Chapter 3: The Extraterritorial Effects of the GDPR in the US Case

The extent to which legal incompatibility has been codified in domestic legal frameworks
can serve as a significant barrier to drafting a bilateral agreement which rests upon conceptual
linkage, or coming to a consensus about the extent to which data should be protected.180 The
evidence in the first section of this chapter reveals alternative logics to data protection that emerged
out of two different policy-making processes, contrasting the EU approach illustrated in Chapter
2, with that of the US. Since the US does not consider data protection a constitutional right, the
US subjugates data protection to the regulatory responsibility of US states, which has led to a
patchwork of data protection laws across the country.181 The logic of laissez-faire governance in
service of economic growth, further narrows the likelihood that the US framework will achieve
the same regulatory rigor as the EU.182
While these are structural differences, there are also cultural factors which give rise to this
result. Data protection law is derivative from privacy, a socio-legal concept which has been
debated since Aristotle.183 A state can codify privacy in a variety of ways, since privacy is both a
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concept which is really a combination of interrelated categories,184 and highly dependent on
cultural factors. For instance, the US is primarily concerned with privacy as it concerns shielding
the individual from the government, while the EU applies privacy law to protect the individual
from both public and private entities.185 CWS anticipates that these structural differences and
cultural factors represent significant challenges in harmonizing data protection across states,
especially with legal attitudes as disparate as that of the EU and the US.
The second section will point to the mechanisms which have allowed for the GDPR to be
exported to the US, highlighting the EU’s novel use of extraterritoriality in the regulation.
Extraterritoriality allows a state to extend its legal authority beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
Despite the effort by the US to shield itself from EU data protection law through bilateral
agreements, the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR show that the opposite is true, and the law has
had a significant impact on many sectors of American society exhibiting its soft power.186 The
third section will focus on evidence that suggests the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR are
manifesting in the US, a jurisdiction which has otherwise been opposed to EU data protection
regulation. The US and the EU attempted to overcome legal incompatibility by using bilateral
agreements to allow for a mutually beneficial outcome.187 The outcomes of these agreements will
be covered in Chapter 4.
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Patching Up Privacy: The American Approach to Data Protection
The American approach to data protection is born of an entirely different legal tradition in
comparison to that of the EU. Unlike the EU which adopted data protection and privacy as human
rights in primary law, the US does not extend constitutional protection to privacy in the first
place.188 It is no surprise, then, that the GDPR has been so impactful in the US. For a jurisdiction
that altogether lacks a comprehensive legal framework for data protection at the federal level, the
US is particularly susceptible to a regulation like the GDPR since the US must pivot from no data
protection regulation to significant investments towards the maintenance of adequacy.189 This
takes various forms, some of which include corporate obligation regarding compliance, as well as
diplomatic resources committed to the continued success of the Privacy Shield.190
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis was one of the first Americans to raise privacy
concerns in response to technological change; in his case, instantaneous photography and the
potential to have a photograph taken and circulated without consent of the subject.191 There are
constitutional amendments like the Third, Fourth or Fifth Amendments, which suggest a right to
privacy implicitly.192 However, this penumbral right to privacy is predominantly concerned with
curtailing the government from intrusion into the home, or infringing upon other personal
intimacies of private life, like political affiliation, sexual preferences or school records.193 The
primary constraint to the penumbral right to privacy is the explicit protection for free speech under
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the First Amendment, which champions the exercise of free speech over any privacy concerns.194
Further, there is a noticeable dearth of federal privacy laws that address the private sector at all,
except for certain industries that handle categories of sensitive data like the financial services
industry or the healthcare industry.195
The American-laissez faire system provides a significant contrast to the European model
of regulation. The Europeans encourage economic competition via data protection standards,
providing consistent conditions for trade across the Union thereby streamlining cross-border data
flows.196 As a sovereign country, the US does not need to preoccupy itself with economic cohesion
as much as the EU does, since it does not need to justify its legitimacy to the same extent since the
US is a nation-state while the EU operates like a political entity. On the contrary, the US has a
preference for light regulation which encourages private entities to self-regulate.197 The
assumption is that companies will assess the appropriate level of regulation as responsive to
consumer demand for regulation, and determine the means of meeting that demand according to
their technical and organizational abilities.198 However, companies have little incentive to selfregulate data protection of their own volition because of the economic profits associated with
exploiting user data.199 Companies are driven towards data extraction and analysis to either
customize services in accordance with user preferences, or to conduct experiments on users in real
time to understand consumer behavior.200 The former manifests itself as features like “suggested
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friends” on Facebook, while the latter is used by platforms like eBay to understand the economics
of auctions.
The responsibility of data protection laws has therefore been delegated to the states, which
may explain why the de jure effect of the GDPR has primarily been at the state level.201 Among
the states, California is a leader in privacy regulation.202 In 1972, the state introduced a right to
privacy from both public and private entities in its constitution, signaling a dedication akin to the
ECHR.203 As the home of Silicon Valley, whose residents include Facebook, Apple, and Google,
California has a special priority to regulate the technology industry. Most regulation has been
reactionary, since California is often the first to experience negative externalities due to its
proximity to the industry. For instance, data breach notifications were first required in California
in 2012, and by 2013 almost every other state had adopted a similar law.204 The string of copy-cat
laws that followed the passing of the CCPA by other states further indicate evidence of the socalled “California effect” which is the shift of regulation in other state jurisdictions in the direction
of a state with stricter regulatory standards.205 Therefore, California may be a catalyst towards
potentially stitching together the US patchwork system for data protection regulation towards a
federal data protection law.206
While neither privacy nor data protection are a priority of the federal government, national
security is enshrined as a federal responsibility in the US Constitution, which has also served as a
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barrier to the right to privacy for American citizens. The bureaucratization of national security did
not begin until after WWII, when the US emerged as a great power.207 The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) was erected in 1947 to gather information on foreign adversaries, often in
cooperation with other countries like the Five Eyes, an intelligence alliance among the US,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom which consists of the sharing of
intercepted telephone calls, texts, e-mails, and other digital correspondence.208 After WWII, the
justification for the continued existence of the Five Eyes alliance was the Cold War. Following the
eclipse of the Cold War, terrorism emerged as the latest transnational threat to national security
which further demanded information gathering.209 Intelligence alliances exist in Europe as well
like the Club de Bern is an intelligence sharing agreement among the sub-states of the EU, Norway,
and Switzerland, however this alliance is not organized at the EU level.210
The US struggled to distinguish the responsibilities of the CIA from the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), which is the domestic intelligence and security agency. The FBI also has a
law enforcement function while the CIA does not. The two agencies often ran into conflict with
one another concerning jurisdiction, exemplified by the Watergate Scandal during which Nixon
encouraged strained inter-agency relations in order to cover up presidential abuses of power.211
After fall-out from the Watergate Scandal, barriers were erected to limit the possibility of domestic
surveillance on US citizens with the passing of the Privacy Act of 1974 to further cement the
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difference between the FBI and the CIA.212 A third intelligence agency, the National Security
Agency (NSA), operates under the purview of the Department of Defense and specializes in
cryptology efforts, computer network operations, and cybersecurity.213 While the work of the NSA
requires less coordination with the other two agencies, it is especially important to this discussion
because the information it collects is primarily through the Internet.
Many of these barriers between the CIA and FBI fell away after the September 11th terrorist
attacks.214 Four planes were hijacked by 19 members of the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda and
crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, and a field
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, but it was intended to target Washington D.C. The attacks resulted
in nearly 3,000 fatalities, and is the single deadliest terrorist attack in human history.215 The US
government was criticized for not doing enough to prevent the attacks, compelling Congress to
pass legislation which expanded the powers of existing policing and intelligence agencies, as well
as establishing the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 to coordinate anti-terrorist efforts.216
The “wall” between the CIA and the FBI fell away, as the war on terror required increased
coordination between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence. 217 The Patriot Act was
signed into law in 2001 with a single opposing vote in the Senate.218 It expanded the scope, power,
and availability of information to the CIA, FBI and the NSA. The Patriot Act allowed for the
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collection of foreign intelligence information from both US and non-US citizens, broadened the
lawful interception of wiretapping, and necessitated obligatory and voluntary disclosure of
customer communications by cable companies.219 The Patriot Act also empowered all three
agencies to use National Security Letters (NSLs) which is a demand letter issues to a particular
entity or organization to turn over various records including telephone, e-mail, financial records
and other data pertaining to individuals without a court order.220 Subpoenas to Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) may include detailed information such as: name, address, local and long-distance
telephone billing records, telephone number or other subscription number or identity, length of
service of a subscriber, session times, types of services used, IP addresses, bank accounts, and
credit card numbers.221 The role of ISPs is particularly poignant for the purposes of this discussion,
since it allows US surveillance agencies to employ Internet to achieve a level of detail which was
previously impossible.
Other provisions which have attracted attention include the authorization of indefinite
detentions of immigrants and the permission to law enforcement to search a home or business
without the knowledge of the business-owner or resident.222 The breadth of information gathering
was justified out of fear of lone wolf terrorist attacks, or an attack by an individual that acts
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independent of assistance from a terrorist organization. There were two extensions to key
provisions granted in 2005 and 2011, however to increasing bipartisan scrutiny.223
The 2013 Snowden Revelations marked a watershed moment for US intelligence. Edward
Snowden, then a contractor for the NSA, stole over 1,7 million US intelligence files, in addition
to 15,000 Australian intelligence files, and 58,000 British intelligence files.224 With the
cooperation of journalists at various media outlets including the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and the Guardian, among others, Snowden confirmed the extent of information sharing
amongst the Five Eyes countries.225 The documents also shed light on other secret treaties between
the NSA and the intelligence agencies of other countries, including Denmark, France, Germany
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Singapore, and Israel, as well as cases when
the NSA engaged in the surveillance of populations without the consent of the domestic
government.226 The NSA program, “Treasure Map,” in collaboration with British intelligence,
seeks to map the Internet by not only identifying the information which is on the Internet, but also
identifying the devices which connect to the Internet. 227 The disclosures, which were spread out
over the course of the next year, further exposed the private-public collaboration enabled under
the Patriot Act with US intelligence agencies. The metadata of international communications were
sourced from internet companies like Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, YouTube, Skype,
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AOL, LinkedIn and Apple, of both American residents and residents of other countries, whether
compelled by an NSL or not.228 Not only does the NSA engage in espionage, but it also
manipulates information presented online, and engages in aggressive cyber operations to plant
malware on the devices of intelligence threats.229
Like the contents of the documents which he revealed, Snowden quickly became the center
of controversy himself, at least, in the US. While the international community largely praised
Snowden for whistleblowing, Snowden was a divisive character domestically. On the one hand,
Snowden was championed as a patriot for standing up for the right to individual liberty from
government surveillance.230 While President Obama downplayed the significance of the
disclosures, and some journalists questioned the significance of the released documents since they
are predominantly concerned with foreign intelligence rather than domestic, the Department of
Defense said that this was the biggest theft of US secrets in history.231 This prompted some to view
him as a traitor, undermining US operations around the world and potentially putting the country
at more risk of harm, echoing the sentiments which led to the Patriot Act in the first place. Prior to
the first leak, Snowden fled to China and then Russia to seek asylum, which further antagonized
the American public. Just a few days after the first leak, Snowden was charged with two charges
under the Espionage Act, and another charge of embezzlement, which amounts to thirty years of
prison if he returned to the US. A month after the first leak, a Reuters poll showed that 23% of
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Americans consider Snowden a traitor, while 31% consider him a patriot, with 46% saying that
they were unsure.232
The contentious portrayal of Snowden distracted from some of the other issues raised by
the leaks. For instance, there was little discussion about whether the NSA was gathering
information that was necessary for purposes of national security.233 The NSA was able to gain
some intelligence about terrorist activity as a result of its surveillance programs, but it is less clear
if the NSA needed to spy on high-ranking government officials of US allies, like Chancellor of
Germany Angela Merkel, or the boards of international non-governmental organizations like
Human Rights Watch.234 One leaked document also suggested that the NSA may not have been
very covert in their surveillance, showing that the NSA accidentally triggered an Internet shutdown
in parts of Syria in 2012 when trying to install surveillance software on a Syrian router. 235 In fact,
the full extent of information gathering is still unknown, since only 1% of the stolen documents
have been made public by the media, at the request of heads of states. 236
The domestic impact of the Snowden Revelations did not result in a new privacy law. The
USA Freedom Act was passed in 2015, which was a reform of the Patriot Act. However, while
implementing guardrails for bulk collection of telecommunications metadata, it restored
provisions for roving wiretaps, and reauthorized the tracking of lone wolf terrorists which
motivated large-scale surveillance efforts in the first place.237 Proposed amendments which
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intended to be more stringent concerning the data protection of citizens, were dismissed, privacy
considered a necessary sacrifice in order to ensure the safety of the country. Perhaps, the most
consequential outcome of the Snowden Revelations is that is showed Americans that their digital
footprint can be manipulated by private and public actors alike which create detailed profiles of
their lives, and that their rights may be better protected under the laws of other countries.238 Neither
the federal laws which shielded data in certain sectors, nor the state-driven patchwork system, were
sufficiently competent to protect citizens from privacy infringement online. Meanwhile, the EU
responded to the Snowden Revelations by passing the GDPR in 2016.239

Becoming “General”: Applying Extraterritoriality with the GDPR
Chapter 4 will highlight the role of the Snowden Revelations in the context of EU-US
relations over data protection; however, the Revelations also had an effect on the drafting of the
GDPR. Prior to discussing the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR on the US jurisdiction, this
section will address the logic of the EU to employ extraterritoriality for data protection. Since data
protection is a human right according to the EU, it was important for the EU to ensure that the data
was being protected in data flows that involve third countries too.240 It would be illogical to suggest
that EU citizens lose a fundamental right once their data leaves the jurisdiction of the EU, just like
EU citizens retain other fundamental rights via citizenship regardless of where they are located.

Freedom Act, Obama Signs It, After Amendments Fail,” NPR.org, accessed April 12, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/02/411534447/senateis-poised-to-vote-on-house-approved-usafreedom-act; Chris Plante, “A Short, Crucial Explanation of the USA Patriot Act and USA Freedom Act,” The
Verge, October 20, 2015, https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/20/9573619/usa-patriot-act-freedom-explainer.
238
Farrell and Newman, Of Privacy and Power.
239
Hallie Coyne, “The Untold Story of Edward Snowden’s Impact on the GDPR,” The Cyber Defense Review 4, no.
2 (2019): 65–80, https://doi.org/10.2307/26843893.
240
Gunasekara, “The ‘Final’ Privacy Frontier?”; Suuberg, “The View from the Crossroads”; Phillips, “International
Data-Sharing Norms.”

49

The GDPR employs extraterritoriality to reinforce stringency concerning data protection.241
However, the feasibility of achieving the necessary level of compliance in jurisdictions like the
US which lack a comparable regulatory framework for data protection necessitated the EU to
review on a case by case basis the ability of third countries to adequately protect EU data.
The nature of data further complicates matters since it means that data may be simultaneous
used by multiple entities in multiple jurisdictions. The quality of data does not change, regardless
of how many times it may be used and re-used, meaning that multiple cross-border data transfers
do not reduce the intrinsic value of the data. At the same time, the transaction cost of transferring
data from one jurisdiction to another is low. This allows data to occupy several jurisdictions at
once, should legal barriers not be erected to govern its transfer. 242 Additionally, it is a high ask of
entities to establish two different processes for managing ex-EU data flows; that is, one for EU
citizens and another for non-EU citizens.243 This may require users to disclose whether or not they
are an EU citizen upon entering a site, which is a data protection violation in it of itself.
The GDPR solves this novel problem by using extraterritoriality. First, the GDPR affords
data protection to all data generated in the jurisdiction of the EU.244 This standardizes the process
for cross-border data flows regardless of whether the data belongs to an EU citizen or not.
Therefore, the GDPR expands beyond the nationality requirement that was previously used by the
Data Protection Directive. Entities that handle data that originated in the EU must adhere to the
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GDPR for the entire duration of processing, regardless of where the entity is located.245 Further,
the entity must be approved for the transfer prior to processing. An adequacy decision, determined
solely by the EU Commission the executive branch of the EU, affords a third country adequacy
for all data transfers between itself and the EU. To achieve this, a country must demonstrate that
it has a legal framework comparable to that of the GDPR which serves to ensure the continued
protection of data. In the absence of such a decision, a country may make a bilateral agreement
with the EU outlining the conditions for data transfers.246
Alternatively, corporate entities may ensure a legal data transfer in a variety of ways.
Binding corporate rules are one method, often used by multinational corporations, which are a set
of intra-corporate policies, practices, processes and guidelines that must be approved individually
by the relevant national DPAs before a transfer takes place.247 Companies may also employ
standard contractual clauses, pre-approved by the Commission, in addition to informing the data
subject of the data transfer.248 Or, companies may use a certification mechanism or code of
conduct, in combination with informing the data subject of the data transfer, to ensure compliance.
Should an entity not be located in a country that has adequacy, or take any of the aforementioned
measures in order to ensure compliance, a legal transfer may occur if the data subject has explicitly
consented to transfer and has been informed of all the risks involved with the transfer.249
The GDPR uses extraterritoriality in order to extend the power of the EU by dictating the
conditions for data flows, whether it be at the state level or at the corporate level. Some academics
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claim that the GDPR qualifies as regulatory protectionism, since adequacy hinges upon approval
from EU officials, like the Commission or national DPAs.250 Normally, the motivation for
regulatory protectionism arises from a desire to shield domestic corporations from foreign
competition.251 To a certain extent, this is true. The tech industry in Europe cannot economically
compare to that in the US, for instance. However, the GDPR was not passed in order to better the
economic playing field for the European tech industry. It was passed in order to safeguard the
rights of European citizens, that being data protection. 252
Further, the domestic consumer is expected to absorb the consequences of regulatory
protectionism since the price of goods rises.253 On the contrary, extraterritoriality has externalized
the effects of the GDPR allowing the EU to “export” its regulation to other jurisdictions, whether
it be via de jure or de facto effects.254 De jure effects would be legislative action that is either
motivated by the GDPR or arises in order for a country to achieve adequacy. De facto effects may
compel legislative action, as corporations globalize their policies in order to be compliant with the
GDPR and consumers of other jurisdictions recognize the benefits of data protection. While
academics have attributed these effects to particular features of the EU or the nature of the policy
area, this paper adds that the GDPR is distinctly able to achieve these effects because of its use of
extraterritoriality.255 This is not to discredit these claims. It is unlikely that the GDPR would have
been as successful as it has, should it have been implemented by another state. However, GDPR
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may also not have been as successful as it has, should it have been passed without its innovative
use extraterritoriality, which was necessary given the nature of data.256 Rather, extraterritoriality
adds to the EU’s ability to take advantage of regulatory competition, compelling behavior in other
jurisdictions to align with the GDPR. Extraterritoriality can therefore be understood as a necessary
rule that the GDPR uses to maintain protection, while also an effect which arises from digital
interdependence with other states. For this reason, these effects will be referred to as the
extraterritorial effects of the GDPR.

The Extraterritorial Effects of the GDPR: The US Case
The EU and the US are locked into economic interdependency, with the size of the EU-US
data flow increasing by seven times between 2008 and 2013.257 The GDPR has become the leading
regulatory framework for data protection globally, and the US illustrates some of the avenues by
which the GDPR exerts regulatory power that is embodied in its extraterritorial effects. In order to
assess whether the EU has or has not been able to extend the GDPR to other jurisdictions, it makes
sense to focus on a jurisdiction which is both reticent to expand the right to data protection to its
own citizens, and is also home to the world’s top tech companies. Therefore, the US has the
potential to be resistant to the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR. However, the opposite is coming
to light. There are observed de facto and de jure effects arising from within the US.
The extraterritorial effects will be presented in two parts, the de facto and the de jure
effects. This is to highlight that extraterritorial effects may manifest through different mechanisms.
The de facto effects concern the role of multinational corporations and consumers as multiple
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channels of communication that may carry regulation to other jurisdictions.258 Firms may choose
to globalize a regulation across corporate operations for a number of reasons, including brand
image, technical divisibility, and compliance costs.259 Risk-averse consumers favor consumer
safety, which means consumers may become jealous of consumers in other jurisdictions that have
data protection while they do not, encouraging them to advocate for their rights. The de jure effect
refers to the responsiveness of US policymakers and institutions to data protection legislation.260
The de facto effects have motivated an indirect de jure effect in the US. Multinational corporations
hope to offset the burden of compliance onto policymakers, while consumers seek clarity
concerning their rights in the US. States have primarily been leading the charge on adopting
GDPR-like laws, with speculation of a federal law in the future.

The De Facto Effects
The de facto effect will focus on changes within the US that reflect shifts in consumer
preferences and corporate behavior toward a general favorability of regulations like the GDPR. It
is difficult to causally link these developments to the GDPR, specifically. However, more often
than not, those within the US cite the GDPR as either their motivation or inspiration. These include
executives of tech companies, leaders of advocacy groups, as well as the average American.
Polling and sentiment analysis indicate that Americans today care more about their privacy
online today, and some are changing their behavior online to align with their beliefs. Despite the
fact that almost half of Americans are unaware of what the GDPR is by name, a Hill.TV/American
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Barometer poll found that 92% of Americans agree with at least one of the provisions of the
GDPR.261 While this may at first seem disconcerting, it reflects that the contents of GDPR hold
wide appeal to Americans and indicative of the regulation’s “ideational power,” a term used to
describe the normative diffusion of ideas.262 Between 53 and 66% of Americans are not confident
that private firms or tech companies are able to keep their information private or secure. 263 They
are not wrong—there were over 4 billion records stolen in data breaches in 2019.264 As a result,
65% of Americans said in 2018 that data privacy is the number one issue that companies should
be addressing, even trumpeting healthcare and job creation.265 Further, Americans are calling for
the government to do more to regulate the tech industry, with 78% of Americans agreeing that
Congress should have data protection legislation as a priority. A Pew poll found that there is
agreement from both Democrats and Republicans that tech regulation is necessary, which is rare
given the bipartisan nature of American politics today.266
Privacy is also developing an activism culture in the US in the form of strategic cases,
campaigning and online movements. Edelson PC is the biggest litigator of consumer class action
cases in the US, and has successfully litigated against Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Google, for
specifically violating consumer privacy laws.267 When domestic laws are insufficient for
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consumers to claim their rights domestically, they turn to foreign courts. For instance, David
Carroll first used the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 to sue Cambridge Analytica, which triggered
UK ICO to fine Facebook under the GDPR.268 The passing of the California Consumer Protection
Act 2018 (CCPA), which is the first GDPR-inspired state law in the US, is largely attributed to the
activism of Alastair McTaggart.269 Organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation
coordinate online campaigns to encourage citizens to vote against bills that may be putting their
privacy at risk, usually collaborating with European advocacy groups like Privacy International in
the UK.270
The media has also responded to this new demand for privacy awareness, signaling that
privacy is emerging as a policy area in its own right. In 2019, the New York Times launched “The
Privacy Project,” to debate ideas, document events, and even offer suggestions about what readers
can do about their online privacy.271 While the media has covered big events like Cambridge
Analytica and the Facebook congressional hearings, it is also picking up on subtler data protection
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dilemmas. For instance, the success of rising tech companies like TikTok272 or Clearview AI273 is
subject to scrutiny, with negative publicity potentially resulting in financial consequences. A
massive increase in the user base for platforms like Zoom or Microsoft Teams as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic has likewise called attention to their privacy policies, causing Zoom to
publicly defend their corporate practices.274
As a result, the private sector has been forced to respond. Because American law handles
privacy abuses as a tort, privacy has been marketed as a mark of quality by tech companies,
signaling that the product is “safe” for the consumer to use.275 For instance, following the
Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, Facebook launched an ad campaign dedicated to “keep you
safe and your privacy.”276 In 2019 alone, Apple launched two privacy-centered ad campaigns.277
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However, Apple has realized its dedication to consumer privacy in practice as well. In 2016, Apple
refused to cooperate with the FBI after the FBI ordered Apple to develop a software which would
allow it to hack into the phones of terrorists involved in the San Bernardino Shootings. Tim Cook,
former CEO of Apple, empathized with the position of the FBI but ultimately was not willing to
sacrifice the privacy of all other Apple users for this singular case. In January of 2020, the FBI
again required for assistance from Apple to unlock the iPhone of a shooter in Florida.278
Companies also have an incentive to globalize their company policies in order to streamline
intra-company coordination among different locations. For instance, if a company is subject to
GDPR in Ireland but not subject to GDPR in the US, the company would want to adopt GDPRlike company policy in order to standardize operations. This is especially true if the data of EU
citizens is stored on the same server as the data of American citizens, in which case it is easier for
a company to extend GDPR-compliance over all data rather than invest in another server. One
lawyer notes that organizations are applying “GDPR everywhere,” since users tend to be “of
unknown citizenship,” and to request disclosure of citizenship may constitute the very data
protection infringement the GDPR tries to prevent.279
Further, a company might suffer from damages to its brand image if it treats consumers
differently according to their jurisdiction. These pressures motivated Satya Madella, the CEO of
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Microsoft, to globalize the GDPR across all of Microsoft operations.280 Further, since other
countries are adopting GDPR-like laws, companies may prefer to globalize these data protection
policies in order to remain competitive on the global market. Still, this calculus differs according
to the corporation.281
Tech companies have turned to the legislation to clarify their legal responsibility towards
data protection, as well as prevent the possibility of overinvesting in consumer expectations.282 In
the Congressional hearings on Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg advocated for a national data
protection law while Facebook was under investigation for privacy abuses.283 These sentiments
have been echoed by 51 CEOs including Jeff Bezos of Amazon, Doug McMillon of Walmart, and
Keith Block of Salesforce, in a letter to congressional leaders which represented business from all
sectors of the economy.284 The response of lawmakers to these pressures are covered in the next
section.

The De Jure Effects
These de facto effects have motivated a push towards a de jure effect. Unlike other
countries which adopted GDPR-like laws immediately after the regulation was passed, the US de
jure effect is indirect, the culminated result of the de facto effects. There has been progress towards
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copycat laws at both the state and federal level, with revitalized commitment from US institutions
like the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice for privacy enforcement.
California has been the first of the US states to pass and enact a data protection law, the
California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) in 2018. While the CCPA is narrower in comparison
to the GDPR with respect to applicability and scope, it is arguably the strongest consumer privacy
law in the US, and was motivated by the GDPR.285 There is overlap in the rights of the data subject,
including the right to disclosure, data portability, deletion and transparency requirements from the
company.286 On the other hand, the CCPA does not afford the data subject the right to rectification,
the right to resist processing or the right to object to processing. In contrast to the GDPR, the
CCPA provides a right to “opt-out” of personal information sales, which requires companies to
have a “Do Not Sell My Data” link on their homepage. If a consumer decides to opt-out, a
reauthorization request should not occur for another twelve months.287 The same identifiers, or
categories of data, are covered under both laws. If damages are pursued via private right of action,
consumers are able to seek damages ranging from $100 to $750 per consumer per incident.288
While this is not comparable to the sanctions that a company can endure under the GDPR, a single
consumer may seek damages for several incidents that occurred in a single visit to the website. If
damages are pursued under civil fines, then the data subject can pursue penalties of $2,500 per
incident, and $7,500 if it is intentional infringement.289
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California has encouraged other states to follow its lead. David Vogel suggests that
economic competition allows for regulatory convergence across the US, with other states willing
to “trade up” their approaches in order to remain competitive with higher-regulating
jurisdictions.290 This leads to a “race to the top” or more stringent standards, uniformly. While
economists have pointed to the so-called “California effect” in safety and environmental
regulation, there is reason to believe that the California effect is taking place with data protection
as well. As mentioned, data protection regulation may follow the same trends of safety regulation
because of the codification of privacy in US tort law.291 Further, because California has
constitutional protection for privacy in its state constitution, it supports stringency in data
protection.292 In fact, this is exactly what can be observed. Despite the fact that the CCPA only
came into effect just at the beginning of 2020, it has already motivated other states including New
York, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Maryland and North Dakota, to pass GDPR-like legislation.293
Due to the public attention on data protection issues, in combination with a proliferation of
state laws in the interest of data protection, there have also been calls for a national data protection
law. While there is bipartisan consensus concerning the need for more data protection regulation,
there is little consensus about how to go about it. For instance, Republicans are opting for pre-
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emption of state laws, while the Democrats are seeking a private right of action.294 However, both
point to different aspects of the GDPR as inspiration for their positions. In February of 2020,
Democratic senator Kristen Gillibrand proposed the Data Protection Act which calls for the
creation of a data protection agency, which is an “independent federal agency that would protect
Americans’ data, safeguard their privacy, and ensure data practices are fair and transparent.”295
Gillibrand points to the role of the EDPS, and suggests that the US implement a similar approach.
However, this would require an expansion of the powers of the central government, and so passing
the Data Protection Act necessitates a large amount of political will.
There have been other proposals like the Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act released
by Republican senator Jerry Moran, which have received bipartisan support.296 In his bill, Moran
suggests that data protection is enforced by empowering the existing institutions like the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the state attorneys general. The FTC is the US institution which
regulates economic competition, and has already adopted privacy concerns as a foundational claim
for unfair competition in the past. According to the FTC website, the $5 billion fine against
Facebook issued in 2019 is the largest fine in the name of consumer privacy ever, by the
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institution.297 This even beats out the biggest penalty under the GDPR to date, that being the $57
million fine imposed on Google in 2019.298

Conclusion
The US provides a sharp contrast to the EU model presented in Chapter 2. Because privacy
does not rise to the status of an explicit right, privacy is curtailed in lieu of other priorities, whether
it be the right to free speech or the economy. The laissez faire governance of the US economy
lacks the regulatory rigor of the EU since it is dependent on the will of companies to self-regulate
for data protection issues. American corporations are unlikely to match the commitment of the EU
to data protection through self-regulation being so would be costly, and corporations otherwise use
this data to improve the quality of their products.
In the US case, federal issues which concern the state itself, like national security, trump
issues like data protection that are regulated by the states. The US has a far greater institutional
capacity in national security than the EU for data protection, investing extensively in its
intelligence agencies and limiting barriers to coordination amongst them. As evidenced by the
public response to the Snowden Revelations, there was little transparency between the US
government and its people concerning the practices of the intelligence community suggesting that
there were few channels of communication prior to the leaks. This presents the US as not only illprepared for a bilateral commitment in the interest of preserving data protection, but it also
questions its priorities align with those of the EU at all.
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Regardless of the American legal framework for data protection, the EU must ensure that
its citizens rights are protected extraterritorially. The nature of data entails that the GDPR uses
extraterritoriality to expand its reach, necessitating that third countries reach adequacy as the EU
Commission sees fit. However, evidence of changed behavior in jurisdictions beyond the EU
suggest that the GDPR is being adopted informally too. The question of whether the soft power of
the GDPR is an explicit strategy of the EU or an unintended byproduct of extraterritoriality, is
explored in further depth in Chapter 4. Either way, complex interdependence plays an instrumental
role in explaining the multiple channels by which the extraterritorial effects take hold, whether
they be manifested de facto or de jure.
The US is arguably the most important jurisdiction beyond the EU for the data protection
of EU citizens, since the US is the biggest trading partner of the EU with respect to the digital
economy. American corporations were among the first to respond to the GDPR, for a variety of
reasons. First, companies are able to save on adjustment costs across jurisdictions if it chooses to
streamline global operations in accordance with the most stringent law overall. As the GDPR is
being adopted directly into law in ex-EU jurisdictions, multinational corporations are being
cornered into compliance. Microsoft and others have already globalized the GDPR in corporate
practices. Second, it also may be technically impossible for a company to separate data practices
according to the identity or location of the user. Further, a blow to brand name capital if a company
is revealed to be treating consumers in one market to a different standard in comparison to other
markets. As a result, Apple and Facebook have marketed data protection as an added service to its
users in ad campaigns, intended to showcase the firm’s commitment to privacy.
Moreover, US consumers are reacting to transnational influences due to the central role the
US plays in the global economy. While US consumers are not aware of the GDPR itself, polling
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data reflects that the major provision of the GDPR resonate with a majority of US consumers,
suggesting that the law has ideational appeal with the population. US consumers have also taken
to privacy activism, pursuing class action lawsuits against US corporations, and pushing for
stronger US data protection laws domestically. Media coverage has reflected a general rise in the
issue salience of data protection spending considerable resources to address privacy as a news
topic in its own right.
As a result of these changes in US consumers and multinational corporations, there has
been an indirect de jure effect. At the state level, there have been several laws passed that resemble
the GDPR, however to a lesser scope. Corporations have advocating for a US federal law in order
to offset responsibility onto US institutions, as well as gain clarity concerning the expectations of
the US market. In response to this pressure, both of the major political parties in Congress have
proposed bills that emulate parts of the GDPR, most notably a bill that would establish a data
protection agency which would operate similarly to the EDPB in the EU. Further, US institutions
have taken to following the EU’s lead in terms of sanctions, with the FTC issuing Facebook one
of the largest fines it has ever given for data protection. Therefore, the extraterritorial effects are
not just motivating what can be construed as inconsequential adjustments in the behaviors of US
consumers and practices of multinational corporations. Legislative bodies are also responsive to
the GDPR, suggestive of structural reform in US data protection law as well.
While the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR in the US case suggest that legal differences
between the two states have been resolved with market-based harmonization, the EU also relies
on treaty-based harmonization with third countries to secure data protection in cross-border flows.
Since the US was not going to approved for adequacy on the merits of its legal framework, it had
to enter into negotiations with the EU. As mentioned, the extent to which legal incompatibility has
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been codified in domestic legal frameworks serves as a significant barrier to drafting a bilateral
agreement. Therefore, despite the fact that the GDPR has resonated with other areas of US society,
ultimately intergovernmental discourse dictates the terms of agreement with regards to the shared
data flow. The US hoped to find a legally interoperable solution, allowing it to preserve its own
legal framework and intelligence practices, while assuring the EU that their right to data protection
was being upheld. Meanwhile, the EU intended to extend their own regulatory framework to the
US. Chapter 4 presents material on bilateral negotiations that have occurred with respect to the
transatlantic data flow, and addresses the success of each actor in the pursuit of these goals.
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Chapter 4: Commercialization of Data Flows Foster Attempts at EU-US Cooperation

The GDPR directly governs 446 million EU citizens, but may indirectly govern another
328 million US citizens through its extraterritorial effects. Rohit Chopra, a commissioner at the
FTC, hints at the irony of this, saying that, “Ironically, many Americans are going to find
themselves protected from a foreign law.”299 The extraterritorial effects of the GDPR motivate
market-based harmonization, aligning the behaviors of US consumers, corporations, and
legislation bodies to align with EU expectations because of unique features of the EU’s proregulatory framework.300 This chapter calls into question the receptivity of another key stakeholder
in the debate— US institutions, particularly the FTC and the US Chamber of Commerce.
The last chapter pointed out the extent to which the EU and the US differ in their respective
regulatory approaches to data protection. While the EU reinforces a pro-regulatory framework
with a bureaucratic apparatus to uphold the right of its citizens to data protection, the US takes an
alternative approach. Because data protection does not rise to the level of a right, the US regularly
subjugates privacy concerns for other priorities like national security, and leaves it to companies
to self-regulate, expecting firms to be responsive to consumer demands for data protection.
Therefore, extraterritorial effects of the GDPR are all the more surprising.
Bilateral agreements provide an opportunity to see if the EU is able to extend its data
protection regulation to foreign institutions, even those with significantly different frameworks
like the US.301 Of the manners in which adequacy might be approved, bilateral agreements stand
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to be the most contentious. Henry Farrell points to intergovernmental dialogue which allows states
to avoid zero-sum games. “If actors representing different systems wish to avoid mutually assured
stalemate, and to identify potential solutions, they typically must engage in dialogue with each
other… efforts to resolve interdependence can involve just such dialogue.”302 The repeated efforts
by the EU and US to negotiated agreements on data protection illustrate expectations of complex
interdependence. At the same time, the vastly different regulatory frameworks presented a
contentious environment for deal-making, with both actors attempting to maintain their own legal
attitudes within their own jurisdictions, while compelling the other actor to make concessions in
the interest of economic interdependence. So far, the EU and the US have twice engaged in
bilateral agreements for the data protection of data flows. The first, the Safe Harbor Agreement
(2000), was agreed upon after the Data Protection Directive (1995).303 The second, the Privacy
Shield (2016), was agreed upon after the GDPR (2016).304 The deal-making processes were subject
to external events like the Snowden Revelations, which dictated the conditions of agreement and
resulted in significantly different outcomes in each case.305
This chapter intends to contrast the two rounds of negotiations under these different
conditions. This chapter reviews three key elements of the EU-US negotiations for data protection:
the Safe Harbor Agreement, the Snowden Revelations, and the Privacy Shield. These key moments
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in the negotiation process reveal the struggle to maintain cooperation, an expectation of complex
interdependence, when there is significant mismatch in the goals of the states involved in
negotiations, suggesting that CWS may serve as a barrier to successful cooperation.306 While the
US committed to adhering to a level of regulation approved by the EU, its dedication wavered
when it was expected to follow-through on that commitment. The enduring desire of the EU to
export its regulation at the cost of watering down the rights of its citizens is illustrative of the tradeoffs a state must make in order in order to maintain a transnational strategy. These cases, described
in detail below, call into question elements of both complex interdependence and CWS, and will
be explored further in Chapter 5.

Finding a Safe Harbor for Data Protection: The First Bilateral Attempt
By the turn of the century, it became clear that the EU and the US had to pursue a
transatlantic privacy agreement. Prior to the 1990s, the Internet was primarily used for processing
of government information, data storage, and research. With the invention of the World Wide Web
and the formation of the first Internet service providers, the identity of the average Internet user
expanded broadly.307 Commercial entities were selling goods and services online, the explosion of
“dot-com companies” promoting the Internet’s economic promise. Also, the Internet was
becoming a social space, a gathering ground for people of different nationalities to exchange
information in spite of barriers like distance.308 Between 1995 and 2000, the number of global
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internet users rose from 44.4 to 412.8 million.309 At the same time, the EU was receiving early
warning signs about the danger the Internet might pose to data protection. The disclosure of the
Echelon surveillance program from 1972 to 2000, shed light on the fact that the network can be
strategically co-opted to function as a surveillance tool,310 while the Y2K “bug” illustrated that the
network is fallible to human error, suggesting that risks like security persist into the Internet age.311
At the same time, the EU was drafting its Data Protection Directive, which was passed in
1995. The Data Protection Directive held many of the same provisions as the GDPR, however,
because it was a directive and not a regulation, the particular implementation of the directive into
national law was left to the EU states.312 The scope of the Directive also limited applicability to
EU citizens.313 At this point, data protection was generally valued by EU states because of the
roles of the OECD and the Council of Europe in shaping a European consensus.314 But the
enforcement of the Directive varied significantly amongst EU states in the absence of an EDPS
board to harmonize enforcement. The Directive was also less stringent than the GDPR because the
EU Charter of Human Rights was not adopted until 2009, meaning that data protection was not
yet afforded human right status in EU primary law. However, the EU also sometimes uses
directives as a means of preparing member states for more stringent regulation later on, which was
true in the case of data protection as well.315 Importantly, the Directive also introduced the
authority of the EU Commission to determine adequacy for third countries, by the same parameters
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which the GDPR outlines adequacy. Australia, Canada, and several Eastern European countries
introduced laws or revised existing ones, in order to conform to the provisions of the Directive and
achieve adequacy.316
The fragmented state of data protection law in the US did not rise to the level of adequacy.
While the US believed that a self-regulation approach provides sufficient data protection according
the US, law the EU preferred a state-led approach in line with its vision of trade liberalization by
legal harmonization. The EU and the US proceeded to pursue an agreement to overcome the
domestic legal incompatibilities in order to preserve their economic relationship. However, under
the guise of bilateral cooperation was an ongoing battle in competing standards. “Both the US and
the EU sought to preserve and extend their domestic systems of privacy protection. Each sought,
in effect, to dictate the terms under which privacy would be protected in the burgeoning sphere of
international e-commerce.”317
The EU perceived this situation as an opportunity to promote its regulatory preference via
bilateral cooperation. One EU regulator stated that a bilateral agreement is much preferred to
having companies individually comply with the Directive via the other channels offered under the
Safe Harbor Agreement. “Contracts only deal with the transfers they are concluded to deal with.
They are much less likely to have any secondary or spin-off effects. Whereas the Safe Harbor was
much more likely to have a general upward pulling or pushing effect on privacy in general.”318
Since the EU is unable to use traditional means of coercion in the international community like
war-mongering, the EU has instead turned to use its regulatory power to motivate effects like those
outlined in Chapter 3. “The Commission bet that US businesses, as they adhered to Safe Harbor,
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would internalize European privacy rules and build pressure for stronger privacy in the US.”319
Part of the EU strategy with respect to foreign affairs is inducing other jurisdictions to align with
EU regulation.320 If a jurisdiction attempts to resist EU jurisdiction outright, it is only a matter of
time before it is induced to align with the regulation. At that point, it is not only access to the EU
market which requires compliance, but also access to all related markets which adopted the
regulation. Of course, this strategy runs into a problem with the US, since the US market is
comparable to that of the EU.
The EU underestimated the US reticence towards data protection. Or rather, the EU
underestimated the US reticence towards extending data protection to the private sector. The
strongest US privacy laws safeguard the US citizen from the government. A 1997 report from the
White House titled, “A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” outlines the ways the US
“sought to embed and protect the US self-regulatory approach as the global standard, hence both
shielding US commerce from foreign regulators and encouraging the latter over time to take a
more laissez-faire approach.”321 The FTC, the US agency tasked with negotiating the Safe Harbor
Agreement, was also highly sensitive to the needs of US companies. US companies were alarmed
at the EU Data Protection Directive, anticipating that compliance would come at a high cost and
risk investments in Europe, putting them at a disadvantage to their European competitors.322 The
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FTC saw bilateral cooperation as way to appease the EU, while minimizing its own commitment
to the agreement.
The US was granted adequacy in 2000, with the Safe Harbor Agreement taking the form
of an exchange of letters between the EU and the US. Ambassador Aaron, US Ambassador to the
EU, developed the basic idea behind the agreement borrowed from financial markets regulation.
Aaron pushed for the Commission to provide adequacy to US companies, rather than the country
as whole, if those companies conceded to compliance with the Safe Harbor.323 There were three
“pillars” of the agreement. Firms had to agree to the Safe Harbor Principles, a set of principles
outlined in the Data Protection Directive, and “sign up either to self-regulatory organizations or
the FTC.”324 While the US Chamber of Commerce administered the agreement, the FTC was the
regulator of US firms on the part of the Americans and had to resolve privacy complaints from
European citizens. Third, European DPAs had the authority to block data flows if notified by the
self-regulatory organization or the FTC that a firm was violating the Safe Harbor Agreement. The
Commission had the power to withdraw its decision altogether if it felt that European data was not
being appropriately handled under the agreement. “While the US could continue to claim publicly
that its basic stance of protecting privacy through self-regulation was unchanged, the EU could
say that it had succeeded in dictating the terms of self-regulation.”325
Despite the fact that negotiators were hopeful of a lasting arrangement, the Safe Harbor
Agreement operated under insufficient institutional development of the US side. First, was the
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expectation that the FTC was going to have the EU’s best interest at heart when enforcing the Safe
Harbor Agreement. The primary concern of the FTC is to enforce antitrust law and promote
consumer protection, neither of which involves ensuring the privacy of foreign citizens. A 2008
report by Galexia found that of 1,109 companies signed onto the agreement, only 348 met the basic
requirements of the Principles.326 Many organizations did not have a public privacy policy, had a
privacy policy that failed to mention Safe Harbor, or had a privacy policy that did not offer a
method of alternative dispute settlement for the consumer. By 2008, the Chamber of Commerce
issued a certification mark that would demonstration the commitment of the company to the Safe
Harbor Agreement. The report found that over 300 companies had false claims about membership
and certification listed on their website.327
Besides monitoring, the FTC was also criticized for falling behind in enforcement and
follow-through. The FTC was only able to enforce the agreement if there was a demonstrated gap
between the privacy promise of the firm and the demonstrated practice of the firm—this is in
keeping with the US idea of data protection as a tort. It was unclear if the FTC had a legal basis
for enforcement if no privacy policy is available.328 The Americans seemed to not be concerned.
In 2007, an administrator for the US Chamber of Commerce gave a presentation to the
International Trade Association on progress under the Safe Harbor Agreement, stating that the EU
considers the Agreement to be the “‘best practice’ for data protection and gold standard for data
protection.”329 This statement contradicted studies done by the EU Commission which called for
stronger enforcement.330
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By 2012, the EU was beginning to draft the GDPR to serve as an update to the Directive.331
With the passage of the EU Charter of Human Rights in 2009, it was necessary to further
harmonization efforts for the internal market. Despite concerns that the agreement might be
faltering, a joint statement from the EU Commission and the US Chamber of Commerce that the
“United States and the European Union reaffirm their respective commitments to the US-EU Safe
Harbor Framework.”332 The US seemed to be coming around to meet the EU on their own terms,
with President Obama proposing a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights in 2012 stating that “consumer
trust is essential for the growth of the digital economy…. For businesses to succeed online,
consumers must feel secure.”333 Not only did the Snowden Revelations derail the Safe Harbor
Agreement in 2013, it motivated the EU to use the GDPR as a way to communicate European
commitment to data protection in the negotiating of the Privacy Shield.

The Snowden Revelations Derail the Safe Harbor Agreement
The commercialization of the Internet provided a ripe opportunity for surveillance because
of the number of users which were online, and because of the amount of information the users left
behind in their digital footprints.334 Companies were already using this data to optimize services,
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which was seen as economically efficient and non-invasive from the perspective of US data
protection law. The Patriot Act allowed US intelligence agencies to access that commercial data,
circumventing safeguards like the US Privacy Act of 1974 in the name of national security. But
this data was not only used to combat terrorism. The NSA was also found to be amassing data for
information’s sake, spying on the boards of NGOs, high-ranking government officials of US allies,
and developing a “treasure map” to locate every device which is connected to the Internet in the
world.335
The 2013 Snowden Revelations derailed any progress made under the Safe Harbor
Agreement. The Safe Harbor Agreement solely addressed the transatlantic exchange of
commercial user data. Negotiations for an EU-US Umbrella Agreement began in 2011, to outline
a data protection framework in the interest of UE-US law enforcement coordination, “for the
purpose of prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of criminal offenses, including
terrorism.”336 The Umbrella Agreement was therefore restricted to data-sharing between law
enforcement agencies. Should intelligence needs arise, it would be overcome via
intergovernmental cooperation, just like the Safe Harbor Agreement.337 More importantly, the two
agreements were believed to work together in the interest of protecting EU data protection by
keeping the commercial use of data separate from data-gathering for intelligence purposes.338
Therefore, the EU was under the impression that the US was appeasing the EU version of data
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protection by ensuring compliance by both private and public entities. While the EU was aware
that the US had reorganized arrangements among their intelligence agencies to lead the war on
terror, the EU was in the dark with respect to the public-private partnership which was enabled
under the Patriot Act. The EU believed that if the US wanted information on one of its citizens for
law enforcement, it would reach out to EU institutions to get it. The EU did not expect the
conflation of public and private interests, nor did it anticipate that the US would amass the sheer
volume of data that it did, in the name of national security. 339
The Snowden Revelations further shed light on the fact that the US was circumventing data
protection commitments to the EU. The EU believed that its authority over the management of EU
data by US entities was supported by Safe Harbor and the Umbrella Agreement, by erecting
different conditions for data protection under private and public use, respectively, thereby
preventing the US from playing one agreement off of the other.340 As far as the EU was concerned,
if the US government needed access to the data profile of an EU citizen for law enforcement, it
would confer with the EU under the Umbrella Agreement. Instead, the Snowden Revelations
demonstrated that surveillance included not only obstructing the privacy of EU citizens, but also
of EU leaders, including the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, which was also leading the
EU at the time. Besides grossly undermining the terms of their agreement, the Snowden
Revelations also signaled a fundamental misunderstanding of European priorities and values. The
very origins of European privacy law, as far back as before the advent of processing, are to serve
as a protection against government obstruction on personal liberties.341

339

David Wright and Reinhard Kreiss, “European Response to Snowden: A Discussion Paper” (Increasing
Resilience in Surveillance Societies, December 2013), http://irissproject.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/IRISS_European-responses-to-the-Snowden-revelations_18-Dec-2013_Final.pdf.
340
Wright and Kreiss.
341
González-Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU.

77

The Snowden Revelations also motivated the emergence of a transnational activist
network. While US activist organizations looked to their European peers for guidance on effective
advocacy, European activists were focused on taking advantage of revitalized interest in data
protection to advocate for stricter regulation.342 Snowden cooperated with European media
organizations like the Guardian, De Spiegel, and Le Monde, increasing public awareness and
heightening issue salience for data protection.343 This had an effect on members of EU Parliament
that sought reelection in 2014.344
In 2013, Maximilian Schrems, a lawyer turned privacy rights advocate, filed a complaint
against Facebook to the Irish DPA, since Facebook has its European headquarters in Ireland.345 He
wanted to prohibit Facebook from transferring his information to the US, where his right to data
protection was being violated under Facebook data-sharing practices with the NSA. By 2015, the
case reached the ECJ, Schrems’ point bolstered by the fact that the EU Charter of Human Rights
enshrined data protection as a human right. While it was less surprising that the ECJ decided to
support Schrems’ claim to data protection, it was shocking that the ECJ went to lengths of
repealing US adequacy under Safe Harbor.346 This decision empowered the ECJ, and not the
Commission, to be the final word regarding adequacy. For European negotiators that had been
willing to compromise on data protection for the sake of an economic relationship with the US,
the decision of the ECJ signaled that there were domestic interests that were being sacrificed in
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order to achieve this compromise.347 The ECJ decision also worried American industry leaders
that were handling fallout from the Revelations domestically, thereby furthering pressure on
American negotiators to draft a new agreement as soon as possible.348
With or without the Snowden Revelations, the drafting of the GDPR was already
underway, and became the fighting grounds for a variety of different interests. The EU
Commission had to demonstrate solidarity with the ECJ decision. Meanwhile, the members of the
EU Parliament were doing the political calculus about whether they should succumb to the desires
of tech lobby organizations, like Digital Europe which fought to limit the scope of
extraterritoriality, minimize the burden of compliance, and the cost of sanctions, or whether the
Snowden Revelations would negatively affect their chance at reelection.349 Advocacy groups were
quick to offer commentary in public consultations during drafting with the intension of expanding
the GDPR.350 From their perspective, high sanctions are meant to preclude companies from
abusing data protection rights because the cost of doing so would be financially crippling.
Further, the EU had to wrestle with the potential consequences of a stringent regulation on
its relationship with the US. If final authority concerning the adequacy of bilateral agreements lies
with the ECJ, not the EU Commission, then it would make sense to make a regulation that reflects
this reality. Additionally, since the US was already in need of repairing its relationship with the
EU, it would make sense for the EU to make a GDPR which was more stringent than the Data
Protection Directive. This way, even if the negotiations with the US did not ensure full compliance
under the GDPR as it is, the GDPR would at least allow the EU to set the terms of the agreement
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at a higher bar in comparison to the Data Protection Directive. On April 14th, 2016, the GDPR was
approved by the European Parliament,351 claiming Europe the title of “world’s leading tech
watchdog.”352

Shielding Privacy: The Second Bilateral Attempt
With the failure of the Safe Harbor Agreement and the passing of the GDPR, it was time
to draft another transatlantic data protection agreement. Still, the US lacked sufficient “rule of
law”353 to govern private entities, or “the existence and effective functioning of one or more
independent supervisory authorities,”354 which would otherwise afford it adequacy under the
GDPR. But, the EU used its new leverage to encourage concessions on the part of the US in the
drafting of the Privacy Shield. The Commission demanded annual written assurances from their
American counterparts to report on how the data of EU citizens was being used by American
intelligence agencies.355 An ombudsman position within the US State Department and independent
from the US intelligence community was established to serve as a point of contact for EU citizens
that want to file a complaint if they believed that US intelligence agencies were misusing their
data.356 This allowed the EU to prevent the public-private partnership which was previously
possible under Safe Harbor.
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Given the demonstrated inefficiencies of the FTC and the US Chamber of Commerce in
enforcing the Safe Harbor agreement, the national DPAs were able to follow up on unresolved EU
complaints, implement a dispute settlement mechanism, and set sanctions for noncompliance.357
The final draft of the EU-US Privacy Shield granted the US adequacy on July 12th, 2016, much to
the relief of American private sector which was primarily worried about the risks of noncompliance
given the high sanctions. Much like Safe Harbor, the Privacy Shield requires organizations to selfcertify to the US Department of Commerce and commit to 23 principles laid out in the
agreement.358 This is a significant expansion in comparison to the 7 principles required under Safe
Harbor. There were expectations set out for the US Chamber of Commerce to engage in more
rigorous monitoring of those businesses that signed onto the agreement. By 2019, nearly 5,000
businesses had self-certified on the Privacy Shield, and the agreement remains in force.359
However, the Privacy Shield has been subject to scrutiny thus far. The ombudsman position
was only implemented after the national DPAs expressed their concerns about the fact that there
was no oversight regarding the use of EU data for US intelligence purposes.360 Consensus between
the national DPAs the EU Commission was necessary, since the national DPAs were in charge of
actually regulating the GDPR.361 Since the Privacy Shield was passed, the EU had passed three
annual reviews of its progress. In 2014, Obama introduced Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD28), intending to “protect the legitimate privacy interests” of foreign nationals, however the first
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annual review of the Privacy Shield stated that PPD-28 conflicts with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), which allows US authorities to access the personal information of EU
citizens via the transatlantic data flow.362 The first review in 2017 recommended that the US
Congress considers extending FISA protections to non-Americans to resolve this issue; this has
not yet materialized.363 The second review released in 2018 was primarily concerned with pressing
the US government to appoint a permanent ombudsman, two years after the Privacy Shield had
been agreed upon.364 The EU Parliament pressured the EU Commission to suspend the agreement
if the US government did not appoint one by the end of the year. The third review in 2019 was
primarily concerned with encouraging ongoing communication between EU and US institutions
in order to ensure consistency in enforcement by both sides, as well as outlining recommendations
to the FTC and US Chamber of Commerce concerning follow-up of complaints.365
Still, the Privacy Shield was considered a success by the negotiators themselves. The EU
sees the Privacy Shield as accomplishing what Safe Harbor could not; that is, motivating domestic
change regarding privacy practices in the US. The second review of the Privacy Shield included
reference to “developments in the US legal system in the area of privacy. These concern, in
particular, the consultation initiated by the Federal Trade Commission on a federal approach to
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privacy.”366 After the Commission gave its third review in 2019, Věra Jourová, EU Commissioner
for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality stated “The Privacy Shield is also a dialogue that in
the long term should contribute to convergence of our systems, based on strong horizontal rights
and independent, vigorous enforcement. Such convergence would ultimately strengthen the
foundation on which the Privacy Shield is based.”367
Of course, the hope is that this convergence of privacy rights shifts in the EU’s favor. With
the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR, de facto and de jure, there is reason to believe that such
convergence is coming to fruition. The Privacy Shield may temporarily lessen the burden of GDPR
compliance for US companies by allowing them to circumvent extraterritorial application by
signing onto the agreement. However, as other countries adopt GDPR-like legislation, it may just
be a matter of time before US companies are forced into full compliance with the GDPR, in order
to be globally competitive.
However, the lifespan of the Privacy Shield is in the hands of the ECJ. In 2018, the ability
of the Privacy Shield to safeguard EU data protection was called into question over the FacebookCambridge Analytica, since both Facebook and Cambridge Analytica were self-certified to the
Privacy Shield.368 That same year, Schrems filed another complaint against Facebook under the
Irish DPA, in this case stating that the use of standard contractual clauses, an approved mechanism
for transferring data out of the EU, are inadequate to protecting his right to privacy. Again, his
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complaint has been referred up to the Irish High Court, and then the ECJ. In its 2018 referral, the
Irish Court was particularly concerned on “whether the Privacy Shield was binding under EU law
and whether the Privacy Shield’s ombudsman system was sufficient.”369 In 2019, Schrems filed
GDPR complaints against Facebook, Google, Amazon, Apple Music, DAZN, Filmmit, Netflix,
SoundCloud, Spotify and YouTube.370 While the 2019 cases may not address the credibility of the
Privacy Shield directly, they will reflect the extent of enforcement afforded under the GDPR.

Conclusion
This chapter presented two iterations of deal-making between the EU and the US in the
interest of keeping an open transatlantic data flow and maintain their economic relationship. The
persistent challenge is determining an appropriate level of regulation, and ensuring the continued
enforcement of that regulation. While the EU is pro-regulation, stemming from a desire to achieve
harmonization of the internal European Market, the US is committed to minimally regulating data
protection in the interest of trade liberalization. One 2019 Congressional Research Service report
went so far as to claim that the EU’s position on data protection restricts international trade and
commerce, comparing it to China.371 This is reflected in the reticence of US institutions to follow
through on its commitments, even under a self-regulatory framework which has been critiqued as
insufficiently protecting data, by advocacy groups on both sides of the Atlantic. From irregular
monitoring of certified companies to stalling on the appointment of an ombudsman, the US has
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demonstrated reluctance to appease its European counterparts, even after having the Safe Harbor
fail as a result of American negligence.
Likewise, there was a mismatch concerning the goals of the states. While the EU
approached the deal-making process primarily in the interest of protecting the right to data
protection by strategically crafting agreements that maintain this right extraterritorially;
meanwhile, the US had multiple priorities. First, was the preservation of an open transatlantic data
flow. Second, was minimizing the economic burden of European regulation on US companies,
whether it be investing in organizational and technical measures or being subject to a penalty.
Third, was maintaining the public-private partnership between US intelligence agencies and US
companies in the interest of national security. Despite the fact that safeguards exist within the
Privacy Shield agreement, as well as the Umbrella Agreement, to protect EU data from the same
abuses that were revealed by Snowden, the US is unlikely to extend the Privacy Act of 1974 to
foreign nationals. In fact, during the negotiations for Safe Harbor, the EU suggested that extending
applicability of the Privacy Act may suffice for adequacy. While the data-gathering practices of
the NSA have since been reformed, the NSA continues to keep those programs active and retains
ownership over the data gathered thus far.
A miscalculation on the part of the EU was the tolerance of EU citizens to accept a watereddown version of their rights in order to maintain a transnational strategy.372 The Snowden
Revelations awoke both Europeans and Americans to data protection violations committed against
them; however, while Americans lacked institutional or legal means to claim their rights,
Europeans were able to turn to their national DPAs, members of European Parliament, and the
ECJ to voice complaints. Not only did this provide Schrems with a platform to derail the Safe
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Harbor Agreement, but it also provided an addition check against future abuses, by affording the
ECJ with final authority over adequacy. While these actors are not represented in the negotiating
process itself, they have been successful at influencing the terms under which the process occurs.
At the same time, these domestic actors pose as a challenge to future data protection agreements,
if they set a regulatory floor which is beyond that which the US can withstand.
Finally, it is important to note the enduring desire of the EU to export its regulation to other
jurisdictions. Not only does the EU intend to protect its right to data protection but also, because
of the nature of data and the economic importance of data flows, encourage other countries to
adopt similar laws. On the one hand, the extraterritorial effects discussed in Chapter 3 exemplify
that domestic attitudes in the US are receptive to the GDPR, even finding agreement among
different sectors of the population. However, there is a discrepancy between the domestic attitudes
within the US, and the views presented in the intergovernmental negotiations. Further, it is unclear
the degree to which these domestic attitudes seek to claim a right to data protection, since there is
a competing priority which is national security. As more jurisdictions in the global economy either
adopt or have pre-existing laws that achieve adequacy under the GDPR, the US may be at an
economic disadvantage to continue to resist enacting a federal data protection law. This strategy
can also allow the US to engage in regulatory competition by proposing its own framework, rather
than seeking to convince other actors to negotiate down from their own position. With the fate of
another data protection agreement in the hands of the ECJ, and the potential of another round of
negotiations on the horizon, it is imperative that the US either meet the EU at the bar it has already
set twice, or offer an alternative approach.
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Chapter 5: The Complex Interdependence of Cyber Westphalia

As of 2019, there are 4.39 billion internet users around the world who have come to rely
on the democratization of information and the global reach of the Internet.373 The advent of the
internet has introduced governance challenges which may alter fundamental assumptions of
international politics, primarily concerned with the ability of the state to enforce state authority
online. Governments have to grapple with an unprecedented degree of interconnectedness and
instantaneous communication, which is disassociated from physical boundaries.374 While the
Internet has facilitated economic growth, accounting for 7% of US GDP in 2019 or $1.35 trillion
in 2017,375 governments may no longer be able to adequately handle these challenges on their own.
Many governments have acknowledged the need for intergovernmental cooperation in order to
handle internet issues.376
A study of EU-US relations allows us to contextualize these problems. These two political
systems attempt to engage in cooperation over data protection in order to preserve a shared dataflow. The GDPR’s success in finding support among different areas of American society, de facto
governing a population beyond its borders, speaks to the complexity of governance in the digital
age. The GDPR has influenced the awareness of an alternative model for data protection for US
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consumers, changed corporate practices of US firms, and motivated changes to US state-level
laws, elaborated in Chapter 3.
While the EU and the US have engaged in iterative institutional dialogue to find a legallyinteroperable solution—Safe Harbor, under the Data Protection Directive, and the Privacy Shield,
under the GDPR—the inability of the two actors to come to a fundamental agreement during
bilateral deal-making called into question whether intergovernmental cooperation on data
protection is possible at all. As outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, each state has a distinct legal
framework for data protection, resulting in disparate degrees of institutionalization. The EU has
erected a bureaucratic apparatus for the maintenance of data protection, while the US has been
unwilling to match the regulatory institutions established by the EU. EU regulators were concerned
about whether data would be adequately protected once exported to the US. Even after achieving
bilateral agreements with the US, the EU saw persistent problems in commitment, monitoring,
enforcement and follow-through by US institutions.377 The EU’s regulatory response was the
GDPR. Although the US has resisted adopting data protection regulation itself, and has tried to
insulate itself from the influence of the EU through bilateral bargaining, it now finds itself in many
ways subject to the EU’s visions of data protection regulation. The GDPR is now the de facto
global standard for data protection.378
As an approach to explain state behavior in cases like these, complex interdependence
offers a powerful—yet not completely satisfying—analytical lens to examine the EU and US
negotiation over data protection, which has culminated, at least for now, in the GDPR. First,
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complex interdependence is particularly suited to explain internet issues because it expects
cooperation to arise in situations when states have common goals. The multilateral participation
in international organizations like the OECD and the Council of Europe, prior to the formation of
the EU, first conformed to expectations of complex interdependence, and set foundational
agreements concerning data protection. Later, both the EU and the US had the common goal of
maintaining an open data flow between their states. Second, complex interdependence can also
help explain why states repeatedly engage in negotiations, despite past failures and different
interests, due to economic interdependence. Third, it highlights the role of non-state actors in
influencing bilateral outcomes. Multinational corporations, Snowden, and Schrems are just a few
that exemplify this feature of complex interdependence.
However, complex interdependence has its limits. The Cyber Westphalian System (CWS),
can explain the conditions under which cooperation breaks down, thereby complimenting complex
interdependence by capturing the alternative option to states. First, cooperation may fail when one
or both actors have competing domestic interests that they prioritize over the issue they are
negotiating.379 The US most clearly illustrates this condition, when it attempted to find ways to
maintain its commitment to the EU regarding data protection, at the same as it continued
surveillance practices in the interest of national security. Second, cooperation may break down
when there is mismatch in institutions or capacity among interdependent states. Without an
institution of its own tasked with data protection, the US had to resort to jointly using the FTC and
the US Chamber of Commerce to ensure compliance, which were insufficient to match the capacity
of the EU’s EDPS board and associated national DPAs. Third, cooperation is less likely when
definitions of key concepts are not aligned. Fundamental differences in legal attitudes might
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complicate cooperative action, evidenced by the EU’s treatment of data protection as a human
right, while the US does not even afford privacy the status of a constitutional right. Finally, CWS
assumes jurisdictions are clearly defined, and adjusted in accordance with the territorial limits of
the state, a feature of international law.
The challenges of cooperation in light of disparate state interests suggest that the EU may
not be able to sustain data protection for its citizens in the EU-US data flow. Complex
interdependence creates advantages for some actors over others, which is what the EU employed
with the soft power of the GDPR. Despite reciprocity, the EU has achieved its own data protection
goals and extend authority into other jurisdictions, thereby enhancing its authority as a global
regulatory power. The EU can only uphold data protection as a right if it is able to do so in all data
flows globally, with the EU-US data flow being the largest data flow in the world. When this goal
was not achieved through bilateral negotiations, i.e., the failure of Safe Harbor, then the EU
formulated a regulation that would achieve compliance de facto. The EU has been able to enhance
its leverage in cooperation from its own institutional capacity shaped from its internal processes
of complex interdependence. This suggests that states which embrace rather than resist complex
interdependence can wield it more effectively when negotiating with other states. Soft power
tactics may therefore be an extension of the existing literature on complex interdependence. By
coupling stringent standards with a bureaucratic apparatus for enforcement, the GDPR effected the
behavior of individuals even in jurisdictions insulated by bilateral agreements like the US. Not
only do the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR push the boundaries of soft power by questioning
who can be governed by a regulation, but it also raises basic concerns about the applicable use of
territory and jurisdiction in the digital age.

90

It is important to note that these claims about soft power may not be generalizable to all
internet issues. Data protection is a special case within Internet governance, since there is
significant variability amongst actors concerning either its codification in law or overall priority
in national interests.380 However, as the ability of states to assert sovereign views is increasingly
threatened by the complex interdependence of the internet, the logic follows that states would
adjust strategies to be successful in this new landscape, employing soft power tactics as a means
of extending their influence by cultivating new norms and appealing to consumers and other
regulators.381 Therefore, soft power allows states to fulfill domestic interests as predicted by CWS,
while engaging in cooperation as predicted by complex interdependence.
The sections that follow will apply the conceptual frameworks to describe EU-US relations
as it pertains to data protection, using the material presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. The first section
analyzes the appropriateness of complex interdependence, highlighting the three conditions of
complex interdependence which allowed for bilateral cooperation. The second section uses CWS
to explain why bilateral cooperation has been challenged in this case, as domestic state interests
compete with intergovernmental commitments. The third section employs soft power to explain
how the EU has at least temporarily gained an advantage with the extraterritorial effects of the
GDPR.
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I’ll Have What the EU is Having: Cooperating for Data Protection
This section uses complex interdependence theory to highlight and analyze important
factors shaping the EU-US engagement over data protection. This section demonstrates that many
of the expectations of complex interdependence were present in this case. First, the multiple
channels of communication that arose between the EU and the US, not limited to interstate
relations. Second, is the role of non-state actors influencing the circumstances under which
bilateral negotiation may occur. And third, is the persistence of common goals between the EU
and the US which explains the iterative nature of negotiation, despite bargaining failures and
commitment issues. Ultimately, the economic interdependence of the EU-US data flow forces both
states into cooperation, regardless of the significant differences in domestic legal attitudes towards
data protection.
According to complex interdependence, multiple channels of transnational communication
complicate the authority of the state, since intergovernmental discourse is diluted in competition
with other channels. Safe Harbor and the Privacy Shield used traditional means of institutional
dialogue, drafted, agreed upon, and adopted through the involvement of the EU Commission, FTC,
and the US Chamber of Commerce. Connections across the Atlantic applied indirect pressure and
heightened the issue salience of data protection within both jurisdictions. A transnational activist
network motivated collaboration between European groups like Privacy International and
American non-profits like Electronic Frontier Foundation. Because Snowden employed American
and European media to make his revelations, citizens in the US were paying attention to European
news outlets as leaks occurred, and vice versa.
While EU citizens had valued their right to data protection prior to the Snowden
Revelations, these multiple channels of communication allowed sectors of the US to adopt
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European sentiments about data protection, so much so that Americans have been claiming their
rights in European courts. This also prepared them to welcome the extraterritorial effects of the
GDPR. Multinational firms, like Microsoft, subject to global pressures, opted to standardize
company practices across jurisdictions to the highest global standard, such as to lower compliance
costs and transaction costs.382 In response to heightened consumer expectations for data protection,
data protection was marketed as a service to the user exemplified by ad campaigns like Facebook’s
in 2018, or Apple’s in 2019. This cultural shift has culminated with the passing of US state laws
that emulate the GDPR, although to a lesser scope, and Americans await a federal law to fix the
current patchwork system for data protection.
These multiple channels of communication allow non-state actors to directly and indirectly
influence the success of these agreements. Snowden is the obvious and prime example. His
whistleblowing revealed the insufficiencies of Safe Harbor to adequately protect EU data from
collaboration between US private firms and intelligence agencies. Snowden triggered Schrems,
another non-state actor, to pursue his case against Facebook in the EU, ultimately spelling the end
of Safe Harbor when the ECJ removed adequacy for the US. Further, the leaks introduced
imbalance in the negotiations for the Privacy Shield in favor of the EU, since the US had to
conceded to demands like the ombudsman position to assure Europeans that their data was being
adequately protected. The private sector was also an important non-state actor.383
Intergovernmental cooperation arose in the first place in order to preserve data protection for EU
citizens while safeguarding their economic relationship. However, because the major tech
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companies were primarily in the US, the private sector was able to compel US institutions to
develop arrangements that would serve in their best interest.
As evidenced by the pursuit of bilateral agreements even after their failure, both the EU
and the US share a common goal. Prior to engaging with negotiations with the US, the EU had
benefitted from the pursuit of regulatory coordination in the organizing of its internal market.
Concerns regarding cross-border data flows were first addressed in international organizations like
the OECD and the Council of Europe, providing the forums for multilateral discourse on data
protection. Conceptual linkage amongst the member states established fundamental principles for
data protection, which contributed to the shaping of the EU Data Protection Directive in 1995.
Legal harmonization was furthered by a bureaucratic apparatus, the EDPS, which ensured
consistency in enforcement across member states. Therefore, the GDPR may be considered a result
of extensive conceptual linkage over time.384
Given this track record of success with regulatory coordination, it made sense that the EU
expected that negotiations with the US would similarly result in a mutually beneficial outcome.
Because of the degree of economic interdependence between the two actors, the existence of a
common goal should have been sufficient enough to ensure successful regulatory coordination,
from the perspective of the EU. Further, the interdependence of the EU and the US is undeniable;
in 2017, the digital economy accounted for 7 percent of US GDP alone.385 Negotiations reflected
that both actors were willing to make sacrifices on their part to try to make an agreement work.
The US was willing to reconcile with the EU despite having other priorities. However, the US
failed to materialize those promises by falling short on monitoring the self-regulating companies,
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and enforcing compliance. The EU understood this as adjustment costs associated with
accommodating a regulatory framework which US institutions and companies were not used to.
This seemed to be the case, with American performance improving in response to the findings of
the EU’s annual review of Safe Harbor. Neither did the Snowden Revelations cause the EU to
abandon bargaining, even after the Snowden Revelations threw doubt into the extent of US
commitment. Therefore, the degree to which both states mutually rely on cooperation, highlights
the applicability of complex interdependence in this case.
Complex interdependence sheds light on the ways in which the digital age shows that
governance is no longer dictated by hierarchy amongst states in competition with each other. Many
actors at many levels are able to influence outcomes, and states have to cooperate in order to
achieve the best outcome. The breadth of extraterritorial effects of the GDPR, as well as the
instrumental role Snowden and Schrems played with respect to the negotiating of bilateral
agreements, speak to this fact. While states have turned to intergovernmental cooperation primarily
to ensure that their own regulatory frameworks are protected in other jurisdictions, states will also
employ soft power tactics, should they have the capacity to do so, in order to shape these channels
in their own favor. The third section in this chapter will elaborate upon the ways the EU has
primarily employed soft power in the transatlantic struggle over data protection.

CWS Complicates Bilateral Cooperation
Complex interdependence defines the conditions which make cooperation desirable; but,
why do states choose to not cooperate, if cooperation is considered advantageous? After all, if the
US had not neglected Safe Harbor, then the EU would not have been encouraged to make the
GDPR so stringent as a response. This section will employ CWS in order to understand the reasons
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behind American non-compliance as a means of understanding the conditions under which the
expectations of complex interdependence are unlikely to realized. Based on a realist approach to
state behavior, CWS suggests that the expectations of complex interdependence break down under
the following conditions: 1) when there are competing domestic priorities, 2) when there is a
mismatch in institutions or capacity among the interdependent states; 3) when definitions of key
concepts are not aligned; and 4) when jurisdictions are not clearly defined.386 I explore each of
these issues in the case of the GDPR, and engagement on data protection more broadly by the EU
and the US.
CWS posits that states are driven by domestic interests, and may have competing priorities
when cooperating with other states, that results in preference divergence.387 Drezner suggests that
“whether regulatory coordination takes place is a function of the adjustment costs actors face in
altering their preexisting rules and regulations. When the adjustment costs are sufficiently high,
[states will not cooperate].”388 Safe Harbor was only drafted because the EU passed the Directive,
which safeguarded the data protection rights of EU citizens. As Chapter 3 highlighted, the US does
not have a legal framework for the regulation of consumer data comparable to that of the EU,
therefore adjustment costs were high in order to fulfill the expectations of the EU in negotiations.
Furthermore, the US had competing priorities. The FTC attempted to limit its
responsibilities to the EU in order to protect the US tech industry from regulation that it believed
would impede laissez-faire economic growth. Additionally, national security was another
competing priority. The US arranged commitments to the EU under Safe Harbor and the Umbrella
Agreement to preserve its intelligence practices which relied on public-private coordination. As a
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result, the US limited its dedication to the EU, since this would mean detracting from national
security. Preference divergence can also lead to bargaining failures and commitment problems.389
The Snowden revelations led to the catastrophic bargaining failure of Safe Harbor after it became
obvious that the US was taking advantage of EU data transferred in good faith through in its bulk
data collection practices. Commitment problems on the part of the US are reflected in the persistent
challenge of ensuring compliance by the FTC and Chamber of Commerce, that culminated in the
establishment of an ombudsman position in the US State Department.390
While complex interdependence emphasizes the role of multiple channels of
communication, CWS privileges institutional dialogue by raising it above other channels as the
manner by which agreements are negotiated. However, this does not imply that institutional
dialogue will always reach the desired outcome. Drezner states that “regulatory coordination is
more likely to take place when preexisting institutions are in place and possess the necessary
monitoring and enforcement capabilities.”391 While the EU has the national DPAs and the EDPS
board that have the technical expertise to manage data protection issues, the US did not have
institutions of its own to match the institutional capacity of the EU.392 Although the US saddled
the FTC and the US Chamber of Commerce with this new responsibility, they repeatedly fell short
of achieving the stringent standard of compliance the Europeans desired.
However, commitment problems also were an issue in the EU. While the EU was able to
institutionalize data protection and achieve regulatory coordination within the EU, this was more
challenging when it attempted to cooperate with the US. After the Schrems case, which afforded
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the ECJ the power to determine adequacy in addition to the EU Commission and ruled Safe Harbor
inadequate under EU primary law, it was difficult to determine whether European institutions had
aligned preferences. Since the ECJ cannot be involved in negotiations, it is disorienting for the US
to be entering in negotiations with the EU Commission without knowing whether the agreement
will be thrown out in a few years. This is the current fear concerning the Privacy Shield, as Schrems
attempts to use EU primary law again, in order to destabilize another bilateral agreement.
Furthermore, definitions of key concepts were not aligned. Conceptual mismatch persisted
throughout negotiations and later maintenance due to fundamental incompatibilities in legal
attitudes about privacy.393 According to Drezner, “ideational pressures in combination with
structure-based approaches lead to regulatory coordination.”394 Regulatory coordination was
achievable in the EU because it coupled conceptual linkage with an institutional framework that
made legal harmonization possible. This built upon a decades-long, multilateral discussion about
the appropriate ways to handle privacy, whether it be by the OECD or the Council of Europe,
which served to align norms inside the EU.395 On the other hand, the US right to privacy is chiefly
from the government, while the European right to privacy is from both public and private entities.
While the average American agrees with the major provision of the GDPR, their assessment
changes when given the option of choosing data protection or national security. If the US is unable
to solidify a constitutional right to privacy after 243 years, it is unlikely to undermine its own legal
attitude for the EU’s, which has had over 60 years to formulate a consensus on privacy and data
protection amongst member states.
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Finally, CWS implies that jurisdictions are clearly defined since hierarchy amongst states
must be distinct in order to assign authority. Because the CWS framework highlights the role of
the state in regulating the Internet, it requires distinct delineation such as to separate one state from
another so that authority is unambiguous. The current international legal framework prioritizes
territory as the basis for state authority, which would otherwise support the CWS framework.396
However, the Internet does not conform to past understanding of territory.
States have tried to overcome this problem. The GDPR is an example of such a regulation,
first using the territorial scope of the EU to constitute applicability, and then also employing
extraterritoriality in order to attach authority over all data flows that involve the EU. The GDPR
further achieves territorialization by moving past the citizenship requirement that the EU Data
Protection used. Since the GDPR applies to all data subjects on the territory of the EU, it
deemphasizes the role of citizenship thereby becoming truly “general.” while, the GDPR
minimizes the authority of other states to claim authority over their own citizens, it also accentuates
the authority over the EU to dictate rules on its own territory, thereby featuring its own sovereignty
as a result. However, although this is legally practical, it may be increasingly technically
challenging to enforce. As complex interdependence suggests, as the number of internet users
increases and the volume of the data flow rises, it may become extremely challenging for the EU
to continue to enforce the GDPR. This inherent tension between complex interdependence and the
CWS system is covered in the next section.
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It Happened When You Weren’t Looking: The Soft Power of the GDPR
Finally, this paper argued that the EU is uniquely positioned to employ soft power to gain
control over the EU-US data flows through the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR. While complex
interdependence suggests that cooperative behavior results in mutual reliance thereby weakening
the ability of a government to regulate its domestic affairs in exchange for benefits from
cooperation, this section will show how soft power provides a way for the state to protect its own
regulatory framework and extend it to other jurisdictions. The digital age is especially
advantageous to states that can to employ soft power since the Internet affords multiple channels
of communication that exchange information at an unprecedented volume and speed.
The EU did have to use cooperation in order to ensure that the data flow remained open.
Without a bilateral agreement in place, the US would not reach adequacy and the EU Commission
would be forced to suspend the flow until an arrangement was agreed upon. Therefore, the EU
approached cooperation with the intention of achieving its own goals. But, more importantly, the
EU employed soft power as a strategic choice, echoed in statements from EU officials and
negotiators alike, with the explicit intention of exporting EU regulation to other jurisdictions,
including that of the US. In the wake of the Snowden Revelations, the GDPR was drafted with this
dual purpose in mind, setting a stringent standard for domestic purposes while using
extraterritoriality to motivate compliance abroad.
Second, Europe had engaged in a deliberative, multilateral process in order to safeguard
this right, long before engaging with the US on this issue, and even before the formation of the
EU. This put the EU in a far better position to advance its model against the fragmented approach
of the US. The regulatory capacity of the EU to handle data protection issues in the form of national
DPAs and the EDPS assured that stringent standards like the GDPR were going to be enforced,
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both domestically and abroad. The EU is also consistent in its strategy to enforce data protection
via institutional instruments rather than relying on the private sector to self-regulation. The
response of the EU following the dramatic collapse of Safe Harbor exemplifies this preference for
institutionalization. Since monitoring failed, the EU insisted on further institutionalizing US
compliance with the appointment of an ombudsman in order to ensure that the US was delivering
on its promises.
The stringency of the GDPR is unquestionable. Not only does it afford the data subject
with the most extensive rights in the world, but it also has high sanctions which if enforced come
to a significant financial blow to corporations. In this case, the Snowden Revelations partly
motivated the political preference for stringency since MPAs in EU Parliament were expected to
strengthen the draft of the GDPR in order to secure reelection in 2014. However, since it was
succeeding a directive as a regulation, the GDPR was anticipated to be stringent anyways,
necessarily raising the regulatory floor for data protection compliance in the EU. As a regulation,
the GDPR also ensured consistent application across the jurisdictions of the EU member states as
well.
Fourth, the EU had a predisposition to regulate inelastic targets which made it difficult for
actors to escape compliance by shifting operations to a different jurisdiction. The GDPR was able
to regulate inelastic targets by territorializing its scope to be applicable to all data subjects within
the EU, and become more “general” since the GDPR dropped the citizenship requirement formerly
used under the Data Protection Directive. However, the nature of data requires the EU to also
assure its citizens that its data was being protected in data transfers to third countries as well. As
Dutch politician and member of EU Parliament Gijs De Vrijes put it: “if you exchange information
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internationally, you must strengthen data protection. Those are two sides of the same coin.”397
Therefore, the EU had to extend its reach through extraterritoriality in order to secure the right to
data protection. However, in doing so, the EU is able to extend its territorial reach398 into other
jurisdictions in order to secure the right to data protection of data subjects that may not even be its
own citizens.
Further, the non-divisibility of standards is the most significant feature that persuades
corporations to globalize their operations to comply with the most stringent standard in
jurisdictions other than the EU. Because of the nature of data, it is often technically not feasible or
too costly for a corporation to segment corporate practices according to jurisdictional limits.
Therefore, the ability of the EU to harness soft power boils down to this condition. The
extraterritorial effects of the GDPR suggest that corporations have been making investments
towards globalizing their operations to align with EU regulation. Corporations have adopted data
protection into their corporate practices, even marketing it as an added benefit of their products.
The multiple channels of communication between the two jurisdictions have likewise
allowed for other extraterritorial effects to materialize too. Transnational activist networks have
heightened the appeal of data protection for the average American consumer, reflecting the
ideational power of the GDPR. Corporations have indirectly motivated a de jure effect, pressuring
lawmakers to pass laws that embody provisions of the GDPR in order to clarify their legal
responsibilities in the US jurisdiction. While this has mainly manifested itself in the form of state
laws, there is anticipation of a federal law on the horizon. Even American institutions have begun
to imitate their EU counterparts, with the FTC giving its largest fine to date to Facebook at five
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billion dollars citing data protection as the main reason behind the fine. This even trumps the
biggest GDPR fine ever given out, which was to Google at fifty-seven million dollars.
While advantageous for the EU, this holds significant consequences for sovereignty which
centers on the ability of a state to express authority over its jurisdictional limits, which is
intrinsically related to territory. In an interdependent world with soft power, jurisdictional limits
based on territory do not match up with the extent of the state’s authority.399 To be clear, this does
not mean that the significance of the state will wither in light of soft power. Rather, soft power
will become the preferred method of state competition since it is able to circumvent the formal
authority of the other state altogether while achieving the outcome it wants. And the EU provides
a prime example for other states to follow. While international law affords sovereignty according
to distinct delineations such as to separate one state from another, this system may prove difficult
to maintain as the ability to dictate conditions of data flows becomes a means of extending
authority into another jurisdiction. Therefore, the EU’s use of the GDPR may encourage scholars
to theorize new interpretations of the means of territory, jurisdiction, and who can be governed by
a regulation.

Conclusion
Weighing the analytical frameworks of complex interdependence and CWS against one
another, it is clear that neither entirely satisfy. Complex interdependence does offer a powerful
lens to explain why regulatory cooperation arises in the first place. The development of data
protection law in the EU exemplifies complex interdependence at its best, with the OECD and the
Council of Europe using multilateral coordination which set a foundation for later EU policies.
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Complex interdependence still remains relevant when explaining why the EU and the US would
engage in cooperation despite extensive differences in their legal attitudes towards data protection.
Their intention to find a workable solution, even after the failure of the first bilateral agreement,
further speaks in favor of complex interdependence.
However, complex interdependence does have its shortcomings. While both the US and
the EU were invested in maintaining bilateral agreements, the persistence of national interests and
disparate institutional arrangements led to American non-compliance under Safe Harbor. Different
legal attitudes meant that data protection was codified to different degrees in each domestic
context. The US was expected to incur more adjustment costs in comparison to the EU, since any
agreement was going to result in obligations that were new to US institutions. Moreover, the US
had competing priorities. While the US lacked the necessary bureaucratic scaffolding for data
protection, it had invested extensively in its national security apparatus, from decreasing barriers
for data-sharing among intelligence agencies to passing laws like the Patriot Act which expanded
the powers of the CIA, FBI and NSA. Therefore, while the US needed to cooperate with the EU
in order to secure an adequacy decision and maintain the EU-US data flow, the US was also subject
to domestic constraints that limited the extent to which the US was able to commit to its negotiating
partner.
Although CWS complicates the feasibility of cooperation, soft power provided a way for
the EU to maintain its bilateral agreement the US while achieving their own goals de facto with
the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR. Despite the fact that the Privacy Shield is in place to
provide US corporations with alternative means of achieving GDPR compliance, the stringency of
the regulation, coupled with its extraterritorial reach, has led to corporations globalizing the GDPR
regardless of jurisdictional limits. Further, the high sanctions of the GDPR are reinforced by the
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EU institutions that are willing and capable to administer the fines. While the de facto adoption of
the GDPR by multinational corporations are a direct result of the GDPR, the other extraterritorial
effects are mainly an indirect result of multiple channels of communication between jurisdictions
that aided in raising the issue salience of data protection among the US population. Networked
advocacy and transnational media coverage provided Americans with knowledge of the associated
risks of foregoing data protection. In response to demands from citizens and corporations alike,
American lawmakers have been pressured to adopt data protection laws at the state level, with
expectations of a federal law in the near future.
Therefore, the soft power of the EU relies on continued bilateral cooperation in order to
sustain the extraterritorial effects of the GDPR. In this way, complex interdependence can serve a
national interest if it provides the ability for a state to heighten the appeal of its own regulation in
another jurisdiction. However, appeal does not come cheap. A state must cultivate appeal, whether
it be from consistency in internal regulation, adherence to stringent rules, or reinforcement by
institutional mechanisms. The endurance of data protection as a right in Europe, later codified in
the GDPR, led to the persistent rationale of the EU to uphold data protection through bureaucratic
means. As a result, the EU was in a better position to employ soft power over the EU-US data flow
because the US could not compete with a framework of its own. Until the US does adopt its own
framework, the dominance of the GDPR via its extraterritorial effects is likely to continue.
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Conclusion: A Future of Contentious Cooperation for the Internet of Tomorrow

In 2017, the Global Commission on Internet Governance wrote a report that noted the
“emergence of contention in Global Internet Governance.”400 Contention could threaten the
feasibility of inter-state cooperation that is requisite to maintain Internet connectivity via the
openness of data flows. Coordination problems amongst states offers clear evidence of this
contention, but states themselves also struggle to balance domestic priorities with transnational
commitments. No longer is the Internet “just a technical administrative issue”401; maintaining the
Internet requires states intervention “for a number of public interest concerns, such as
infrastructure availability, security, and individual civil liberties.”402 As Internet governance is
inherently multifaceted, involving many actors that are concerned with particular applications of
the Internet, such as trade, development or national security, rather than its technical
underpinning.403 As a result, identifying shared governance solutions through cooperation will
become more challenging at both the domestic and international levels. States unique approaches
to their priorities and policies governing the Internet will further complicate inter-state relations;
coordination among states will require tailored approaches to meet the specific needs of the
negotiating states.
The findings of this paper provide valuable insights concerning the feasibility of state
cooperation for Internet governance. While data protection is only one of many state concerns
related to the Internet, it is a central issue that may facilitate or impede data flows. The transatlantic
data protection debate between the EU and the US illustrates that while cooperation is desirable,
400
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it may be unexpectedly challenging to execute in reality, even amongst political and economic
allies. Differences in the relative priorities of the US and the EU led to persistent challenges in the
maintenance of data protection agreements, a problem exacerbated by insufficient institutional
competence on the part of the US, as the US attempted to maintain a focus on national security,
even as it conflicted with its bilateral commitments on data protection. At the same time, states
had to consider with the interests of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and
activists, who attempted to influence or resist state regulations. Therefore, contention arises not
only internationally, but also domestically, as states must wrestle with multiple priorities in
combination with demands from many actors.
Moreover, this paper highlights the fact that longstanding legal approaches are applied to
Internet governance in each case, and not designed from scratch to address the challenges of the
digital realm. While one might expect that technological innovation prompt novel legal
instruments, in fact fundamental ideas about civil liberties like privacy dictate how states respond
to new technological pressures. The multilateral agreement amongst EU member states, a
consensus facilitated by the OECD and the Council of Europe that was fifty years in the making,
upheld data protection as a human right. Without this legal history, the EU likely would not have
had the political will to create the stringent rules it did under the GDPR. In turn, the EU was able
to pass the GDPR, codify data protection as a human right in pre-existing institutions like the ECJ,
and also create new institutions like the EDPB that were tasked with the primary responsibility of
safeguarding this right.
As contention rises amongst states, making cooperation more difficult, states may employ
soft power as a means of reconciling the tensions between internal priorities and bilateral
commitments. Soft power can be used to persuade non-state actors and subnational actors about
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the merits of the state’s desired regulatory model. Asymmetries in institutional capacity provide
states like the EU the ability to forward its data protection agenda indirectly through the
extraterritorial effects of regulation. The EU derives a competitive advantage from that fact that it
had unified 28-member states on a single regulatory approach to data protection, a model that in
turn exerts influence through non-state actors within the US jurisdiction. While this competitive
advantage can be especially effective in the highly fragmented nature of US federalism, it holds
true for every other state that hopes to negotiate with the EU due to the stringency of the GDPR
which applies globally. As a result, the EU may be willing to tolerate cooperative interstate
agreements which may formally protect data at a de jure lower standard than the GDPR, since it
is able to achieve de facto extraterritorial compliance through the use of other channels.
The EU-US transatlantic data protection debate confirms that cooperation is increasingly
contentious, as states like the EU capitalize on their institutional capacities to extend their influence
extraterritorially with legislation like the GDPR. As the complexities associated with
interdependent governance of data grows, it is anticipated that more states adopt soft power tactics
in order to resolve the tension between internal and external responsibilities. The distinction among
states will wane as states extend authority beyond jurisdictional limits, further obscuring sovereign
boundaries. Therefore, the use of technical infrastructure as a proxy for territory offers an
incomplete legal framework to account for the disassociation of state power from territorial
constraints with respect to Internet issues. In light of this conclusion, I encourage scholars to
theorize new ways of applying jurisdiction to cyberspace, such that state sovereignty is defined in
terms other than territory, thereby accounting for the nature of data.
Finally, states that uphold data protection as a human right have another barrier to the
maintenance of this right, beyond their bureaucratic duty to engage in cooperation with third
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countries: time. While states like the EU incur an initial competitive advantage from accumulated
knowledge in its institutions, the sustainability of its right to data protection can only be tested by
its endurance over time. Moore’s law states that every 18 months computer processing capabilities
double.404 As technologies like artificial intelligence, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT)
enter the homes of average citizens, the right to data protection is further endangered, as the
question is no longer if it should be enforced, but if it could be practically enforced at
all.405Although institutions can marginally adapt legal interpretations to account for shifts in shortrun, the durability of the right to data protection in the long-run ultimately comes down to the time
lost between now and catch up.
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